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Presentation of the work 
 
The following work is submitted for the degree of Ph.D. in Finance at the Faculty of 
Economics, University of Lugano. During my Ph.D. I wrote three articles dealing with two 
main subjects: the first one is the so called “Kernel Puzzle” while the second one is the 
problem of immunization of portfolio of treasury and corporate bonds. 
 
For the first topic, I wrote an article with professor Giovanni Barone Adesi: “Is the 
Pricing Kernel Monotone?”. In this article we provide a new method to derive the state price 
density per unit probability based on option prices and GARCH model. We derive the risk 
neutral distribution using the result in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) and the historical 
density adapting the GARCH model of Barone-Adesi, Engle, and Mancini (2008). We take 
the ratio of these two probabilities in order to describe the shape of the state price density 
and to evaluate its consistency with economic theory. We find that using a large dataset and 
introducing non-Gaussian innovations, the pricing kernel puzzle that arises in Jackwerth 
(2000) disappears both in a single day and over an average of different days with options 
expiring at the same maturity. We also evaluate the price kernel at the onset of the recent 
crisis. 
 
For the second topic I wrote two articles. The first one is a joint work with professor 
Nicola Carcano which deals with the immunization of a portfolio of treasury bonds against  
interest rate risk. This article has been concluded in 2011 and it is forthcoming on the 
“Journal of Banking and Finance”. In particular in this article we test alternative models of 
yield curve risk by hedging US Treasury bond portfolios through note/bond futures. We show 
that traditional implementations of models based on principal component analysis, duration 
vectors and key rate duration lead to high exposure to model errors and to sizable 
transaction costs, thus lowering the hedging quality. Also, this quality randomly varies from 
one model and hedging problem to the other. We show that accounting for the variance of 
modeling errors substantially reduces both hedging errors and transaction costs for all 
considered models. Additionally, it leads to much more stable weights in the hedging 
portfolios and as a result to more homogeneous hedging quality. On this basis, error-
adjusted principal component analysis is found to systematically and significantly outperform 
alternative models.  
The last article is a joint work with professors Giovanni Barone-Adesi and Nicola 
Carcano and deals with the problem of immunization of a portfolio of corporate bonds. In this 
article, we test alternative strategies for hedging a portfolio composed from BBB-rated 
corporate bonds. Our results highlight a change of regime. From 2000 to 2007, a hedging 
strategy based only on T-bond futures would have reduced the variance of the portfolio by 
circa 83.5%. This compares well to the maximum variance reduction of 50% reported by 
previous studies hedging corporate bonds through T-bond and S&P500 futures. We attribute 
this improvement to the use of four futures contracts with different maturity and to the 
consideration of modeling errors. On the contrary, in 2008 and 2009 T-bond futures would 
have been insufficient to successfully hedge our bond portfolio. The use of the 5-year CDX 
contract would have only marginally improved the quality of hedging. We attribute the 
disappointing hedging performance of CDX to counterparty risk and show that credit 
derivatives free of default risk could have led to a variance reduction over 64% even during 
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We provide a new method to derive the state price density per unit
probability based on option prices and GARCH model. We derive
the risk neutral distribution using the result in Breeden and Litzen-
berger (1978) and the historical density adapting the GARCH model
of Barone-Adesi et al. (2008). We take the ratio of these two proba-
bilities in order to describe the shape of the state price density and
to evaluate its consistency with economic theory. We find that using
a large dataset and introducing non-Gaussian innovations, the pric-
ing kernel puzzle that arises in Jackwerth (2000) disappears both in a
single day and over an average of different days with options expiring
at the same maturity. We also evaluate the price kernel before and
during the recent crisis and we look at the change in the shape in
order to evaluate the difference.
Keywords: Pricing kernel, State price density per unit probability,
Risk neutral, Historical distribution.
JEL Classification: G12, G13, G14.
3
1 Introduction
According to economic theory, the shape of the kernel price or the state price
density (SPD) per unit probability (also known as the asset pricing kernel
(Rosenberg and Engle (2002)) or stochastic discount factor (SDF) (Campbell
et al. (1997))) is a decreasing function in wealth.
In their paper, Jackwerth (2000) find a kernel price before the crash of
1987 in agreement with economic theory, but a discordant result for the
post-crash period. After their work, a number of papers have been written
on this topic explaining the reason for this puzzle. Rosenberg and Engle
(2002), Detlefsen et al. (2007) and Jackwerth (2004) are among the most
interesting papers on this topic. Unfortunately, none of them found an answer
to this puzzle. In all of their papers they found problems in the methodology
previous papers presented and tried to improve them, but the result was the
same: the puzzle remained.
An answer to this puzzle has been given in Chabi-Yo et al. (2005) where
they argue that the main problem in this puzzle is the regime shifts in funda-
mentals: when volatility changes, the kernel price is no longer monotonically
decrease. In each regime they prove that the kernel price is consistent with
economic theory, but when there is a shift in regime the kernel price changes
in its shape and it is no longer consistent with economic theory.
In a recent paper, Barone-Adesi et al. (2008) compute again the kernel
price in a parametric method and they find kernel prices consistent with eco-
nomic theory. In particular they find kernel price consistency for fixed matu-
rities. They do not use different maturities as Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998) and
therefore they avoid the problem that arises when the maturity is different,
but they do not consider the change in fundamental as a relevant aspect of
the computation. This result can be explained if we consider that the sample
they use is very short in time (3 years) and in that period (2002 - 2004) the
volatility does not make big change.
In this paper we use real data to describe the shape of the kernel price as
presented in the market. We compute the kernel price both in a single day
and as an average of kernel prices in a period of time (considering a fixed
maturity). We want to understand the implication of the changing regime
using two measures of moneyness: in the first case we consider the kernel
price as a function of only two parameter (we do not take into consideration
the changing regime) and then as a function of underlying, interest rate and
volatility. In order to evaluate the kernel price we need to take a broad index
2
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which attempts to cover the entire economy. We decide to use options index
on the S&P500 with a time series of 12 years (from the 2nd of January 1996
to the 31st December 2007).
Evaluating the kernel price in a period of time without taking into consid-
eration the change in volatility should lead to a kernel not anymore consisted
with economic theory. Surprising, when we compute the kernel price consid-
ering only two parameters (the underlying and the interest rate), the average
of kernel price is consistent with economic theory (with the exceptions of
some points). The main reason for this result is the methodology we use to
compute the two probabilities.
In order to estimate the risk neutral distribution, we use the well known
result in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). The difference with previous
works is in the options we use. Instead of creating option prices through
nonparametric or parametric models (all the previous research use artificial
price of options and this could introduce a bias in the methodology), we use
only the options available on the market. We then construct the histori-
cal density using the GJR GARCH model with Filter Historical Simulation
already presented in Barone-Adesi et al. (2008).
As discussed in Barone-Adesi et al. (2008), among the several GARCH
models, the GJR GARCH with FHS has the flexibility to capture the leverage
effect and has the ability to fit daily S&P500 index returns better. Then, the
set of estimated scaled innovations gives an empirical density function that
incorporates excess skewness, kurtosis, and other extreme return behavior
that is not captured in a normal density function. These features avoid
several problems in the estimation of the kernel price. For example, using
a simple GARCH model where the innovations are standard normal (0, 1)
leads to a mispecification of the return of the underlying.
Once we have the two probabilities, we take the ratio between the two
densities, discounted by the risk-free rate, in a particular day, and we get the
kernel price for a fixed maturity. We repeat the same procedure for all the
days in the time series which have options with this maturity and then we
take the average of the kernel price through the sample.
We also evaluate how the shape of the price kernel changes before and
during a crisis (the 2008 crisis). We notice that the three periods before the
crisis (2005, 2006 and 2007) exhibit fairly monotonically decreasing paths,
while during the crisis, the kernel price remains monotonically decrease but
has higher values. (consistency with the idea that during a crisis an investor
increase the risk aversion).
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In order to evaluate the impact of the shifting regime, we repeat the
computation of the differen kernel prices considering the volatility as a pa-
rameter of the kernel function. Surprising, the results have an improvement,
but thanks to the methodology we used in the case of kernel price without
volatility, the results are quite similar, supporting our first intuition that
the changing regime is an important aspect, but also the methodology has a
strong impact on the final result.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
present a review of the literature and we define the “pricing kernel puzzle”. In
section 3, we define our method to estimate the kernel price. We explain the
application of the result of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) for a discrete case
and we derive the risk neutral distribution. We then estimate the historical
density using a GJR GARCH method with FHS and we take the kernel
price from a particular day as well as the kernel price over the time series
of our sample. In section 4, we provide other evidence of our results. First
we plot kernel price with different maturities to prove the robustness of our
methodology, then we take the average of these different kernel prices and we
show that the average of SPD per unit probabilities with closing maturities
have a monotonically decreasing path. In section 5, we present the change
in the kernel price shape before and during the recent crisis. In section 6,
we extend our model, using a kernel price with 3 parameters (underlying,
volatility and risk-free), and in section 7 we offer some conclusions.
2 Review of the Literature
In this section we derive the price kernel as in microeconomic theory and also
as in probability theory. We then present some methods, parametric and non
parametric to derive the kernel price.
2.1 Price kernel and investor preference
The ratio between the risk neutral density and the historical density is known
as the price kernel or state price density per unit probability. In order to ex-
plain the relationship between the risk-neutral distribution and the historical
distribution we need to introduce some basic concepts from macroeconomic
theory. In particular, we use a representative agent with a utility function
U(·). According to economic theory (the classical von Neumann and Mor-
4
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genstern economic theory), we have three types of investors: risk averse, risk
neutral and risk lover. The utility function U(·) of these investors is a twice-
differentiable function of consumption c: U(c). The common property for the
three investors is the non-satiation property: the utility increase with wealth
e.g. more wealth is preferred to less wealth, and the investor is never satis-
fied - he never has so much wealth that getting more would not be at least
a little bit desirable. This condition means that the first derivative of the
utility function is always positive. On the other hand, the second derivative
changes according to the attitude the investor has towards the risk.
If the investor is risk averse, his utility function is an increasing concave
utility function which displays a strictly negative second derivative. The risk
neutral investor has a second derivative equal to zero while the risk seeker has
a second derivative strictly positive, which means a convex utility function.
Defining u(·) as the single period utility function and β as the subjective
discount factor, we can write the intertemporal two-period utility function
as
U(ct, ct+1) = u(ct) + βu(ct+1.)
We introduce ξ as the amount of an asset the agent chooses to buy at time
t, e as the original endowment of the agent, Pt as the price of the asset at




u(ct) + Et [βct+1] ,
subject to
ct = et − Ptξ,
ct+1 = et+1 + xt+1ξ.
The first constraint is the budget constraint at time 1, while the second
constraint is the Walrasian property e.g. the agent will consume all of his
endowment and asset’s payoff at the last period. Substituting the constrains
















= mt,t+1 = MRS,
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as the Marginal rate of Substitution at time t. The MRS is also known as
the Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) or Price Kernel. Therefore the price
of any asset can be expressed as
Pt = Et [mt,t+1xt+1] . (1)




mt,T (ST )xT (ST )pt,T (ST )dST , (2)
where pt,T (ST ) is the probability of state ST (for the rest of the paper we
refer to this probability as the historical probability).
To define the price of an asset at time t, under the risk neutral measure,
we can write equation 2 as:




xT (ST )qt,T (ST )dST , (3)
where qt,T (ST ) is the state price density (for the rest of the paper we refer
to this probability as the risk neutral probability). At this point, combining
equation 2 and 3 we can derive the SDF as:




In this case we consider a two period model where the price kernel is a
function only of the underlying and of the risk-free rate. In the following
part we will see how to have a kernel price with more parameters.
In their papers Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1964) find a connection between
the kernel price and the measure of risk aversion of a representative agent.
We can define the agent’s coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) as:




A decreasing relative risk aversion indicates that the percentage of wealth
one is willing to expose to risk increase with wealth. Constant relative risk
aversion implies that the percentage of wealth one is willing to expose to risk
remains unchanged as wealth increases or decreases. Increasing relative risk
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aversion means that the percentage of wealth one is willing to expose to risk
falls as wealth increases.
The absolute risk aversion is the absolute amount of wealth an individual
is willing to expose to risk as a function of changes in wealth. The absolute
risk aversion can be decreasing, constant or increasing in wealth. Decreasing
absolute risk aversion means that the amount of wealth someone is willing to
expose to risk increases as wealth increase. Constant absolute risk aversion
means that the amount of wealth one is willing to expose to risk remains
unchanged as wealth increase or decrease. Increasing absolute risk aversion
means that one’s tolerance for absolute risk exposure falls as wealth increases.
The pricing kernel can be written as function of the marginal utility as:




and the first derivative is:




Using the first and the second derivatives of the utility function from equation
6 and equation 7 we can write the RRA as:











Using the definition of MRS, we can write the RRA as:


























2.2 Nonparametric and parametric estimation
There are several methods to derive the kernel price. There are both para-
metric models and nonparametric models. In this section we give a review
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of the most well-known method used in literature. We focus particularly on
the nonparametric model because they do not assume any particular form
for the risk neutral and historical density and also for the kernel price.
One of the first papers to recover the price kernel in a nonparametric way
is Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998). In their work they derive the option price func-
tion by nonparametric kernel regression and then, throughout the result in
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), they compute the risk neutral distribution.
Their result is not consistent with economic theory, but, because they look
at the time continuity of mt,T across time, we may understand their results
as estimates of the average kernel price over the sample period, rather than
as conditional estimates.
Additional problems in their article are discussed in Rosenberg and Engle
(2002). In particular they suggest that the non specification of the investors
beliefs about future return probabilities could be a problem in the evaluation
of the kernel price. Also their use of a very short period of time, 4 years, to
estimate the state probabilities may be problematic. Moreover, they depart
from the literature on stochastic volatility, which suggests that future state
probabilities depend more on the recent events than past events. In fact, past
events remain useful for prediction of future state probabilities. In order to
avoid this problem we use a dataset of 12 years of option prices.
A work close in spirit to Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998) is Jackwerth (2000).
His article is one of the most interesting pertaining to this literature. Beyond
the estimation technique he used, his paper also opened up the well-known
”pricing-kernel puzzle”. In his nonparametric estimation of the kernel price,
Jackwerth finds that the shape of this function is in accordance with economic
theory before the crash of 1987, but not for the period after the crash. He
concludes that the reason is the mispricing of options after the crash.
Both articles could incur some problems that cause the kernel price and
the relative risk aversion function (RRA) to be not consistent with economic
theory. In Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998), we see that, if the bandwidth changes,
the RRA changes as well and this means that the methodology used influ-
ences the shape of the RRA; on the other hand, in Jackwerth (2000), the use
of option prices after the crisis period could influence the shape of the kernel
price if volatility is misspecified.
Another nonparametric estimation model for the kernel price is given
by Barone-Adesi et al. (2008), where they relax the normality assumption
in Rosenberg and Engle (2002) and provide a nonparametric estimation of
the ratio qt,T/pt,T . While in the papers by Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and
8
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Jackwerth (2000) results are in contrast with the economic theory, Barone-
Adesi et al. (2008) find a kernel price which exhibits a fairly monotonically
decreasing shape.
Parametric methods to estimate the kernel price are often used in litera-
ture. Jackwerth (2004) provides a general review on this topic, but for the
purpose of our work we do not go into detail on parametric estimation. As
pointed out by Birke and Pilz (2009) there are no generally accepted para-
metric forms for asset price dynamics, for volatility surfaces or for call and
put functions and therefore the use of parametric methods may introduce
systematic errors.
Our goal is to test whether a different nonparametric method, starting
with option pricing observed in the market, respects the conditions of no-
arbitrage present in Birke and Pilz (2009). In particular, we test if the first
derivative of the call price function is decreasing in the strike and the second
derivative is a positive function. These conditions should guarantee a kernel
price monotonically decreasing in wealth.
It is important to underlying that our kernel price is a function of three
variables: the underlying price, the risk-free rate and the volatility. In the
first part, we use only the first two of them: the underlying asset and the risk-
free rate. At the end of the article we extend our methodology introducing
the volatility.
3 Empirical kernel price
In this section we compute the kernel price as the ratio of the risk-neutral
density and the historical one, discounted by the risk-free interest rate. In
the first part we describe how we compute the risk-neutral density. In the
second part, we explain our computation of the historical density. In each
part we describe the dataset we use and our filter for cleaning it.
For the risk-free we use the Unsmoothed Fama-Bliss zero-coupon rate.
The methodology followed for the estimation of these rates has been described
in Bliss (1997).
3.1 Risk-neutral density
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) shows how to derive the risk-neutral density
from a set of call options with fixed maturity. They start from a portfolio
9
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with two short call options with strike K and long two call with strikes K
-  and K +  and they consider 1
2
shares of this portfolio. The result is
a butterfly spread which pays nothing outside the interval [K -  ; K + ].
Letting  tend to zero, the payoff function of the butterfly tends to a Dirac
delta function with mass at K, i.e. this is simply an Arrow-Debreu security
paying $1 if ST = K and nothing otherwise (see Arrow (1964)). In this case,
define K as the strike price, St the value of the underlying today, r as the




[2C(St, K, T, r)− C(St, K − , T, r)− C(St, K + , T, r)]
(12)









xbutterfly(ST )qt(ST )dST . (13)




−rT qt(ST ). (14)




−rT qt(ST ) = e−rT





This result suggests that the second derivative of a call price (we will see
that it is also true for a put price) with respect to the strike price gives the
risk neutral distribution. In the next part of this section we see how to apply
this result in the discrete case.
In the following, we consider three call options with strikes Ki, Ki−1, Ki+1,
where Ki+1 > Ki > Ki−1. We have seen that the price of a call option can
be written as:
C(St, K, T ) =
∫ ∞
K
e−rT (ST −K)f(ST )dST . (16)
We define F (x) as the cumulative distribution function, f(x) as the probabil-
ity density, C(St, K, T ) as the price of a European call option, P (St, K, T ) as
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the price of a European put option, and K as the strike price of the reference
option. According to the result in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) taking
the first derivative with respect to the strike price, we get:







e−rT (ST −K)f(ST )dST
]
=
= e−rT [−(K −K)f(K) +
∫ ∞
K




−f(ST )dST = −e−rT [1− F (K)]
F (K) = erT
∂C(St, K, T )
∂K
+ 1 (17)
Which gives us the value for F(K) which is the cumulative distribution func-
tion. In order to find F(x) in the discrete case, we can use the following
approximation:
F (Ki) ≈ erT
[




Now, take the second derivative in a continuous case, we have:
f(K) = erT





that is the result in equation 15. We can approximate this result in the
discrete case as:





The same is also true for the put options. In that case the two approximate
distributions (cumulative and density) are given as:
F (Ki) ≈ erT
[












A recent paper by Figlewski (2008) is very close in spirit to our work. In
his paper he derives the risk neutral distribution using the same result in
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). We differ from him in some aspects. First,
we use the bid and ask prices that are given on the market to construct
butterfly spreads. e.g. for the long position the ask price is used and for
the short position the bid price. This way we avoid negative values in the
risk-neutral distribution and we respect the no-arbitrage condition described
in Birke and Pilz (2009). Second, we do not need to convert the bid, ask,
or mid-prices into implied volatility to smooth the transition from call to
put because we take the average of butterfly prices from several days with
equal maturities and this improves the precision of our result (see Figure 2).
Other similar works are discuss in Bahra (1997), Pirkner et al. (1999) and
Jackwerth (2004).
In Bahra (1997), the author proposes several techniques to estimate the
risk neutral density. For every method he explains the pros and the cons. He
then assumes that the risk neutral density can be derived either in a para-
metric method, by solving a least squares problem, or in a nonparametric
method, using kernel regression. In our work, using a time series of options
over a sample of 12 years and taking the average of them, we avoid the para-
metric or nonparametric pricing step and therefore we rely only on market
prices.
In Pirkner et al. (1999), they use a combination approach to derive the
risk neutral distribution. They combine the implied binomial tree and the
mixture distributions to get the approach called “Mixture Binomial Tree”.
The main difference with this work is in the use of the options types. In their
work, they use American options and therefore they could have the problem
of early exercise. In our sample, we consider only European options to be
sure to have the risk neutral density for the appropriate expiration time.
Jackwerth (2004) may be considered as a general review of different meth-
ods and problems. He concentrates in particular on nonparametric estima-
tion, but he gives a general overview also on parametric works, dividing every
parametric work in a particular class and explaining the positive and negative
aspects.





We use European options on the S&P 500 index (symbol: SPX) to implement
our model. We consider the closing prices of the out-of-the-money (OTM)
put and call SPX options from 2nd January 1996 to 29th December 2007.
It is known that OTM options are more actively traded than in-the-money
options and by using only OTM options one can mitigate the potential issues
associated with liquidity problems.
Option data and all the other necessary data are downloaded from Op-
tionMetrics. We compute the risk-neutral density at two different maturities:
37 days and 72 days. Our choice of maturities is random and the same proce-
dure can be applied for other maturities. We download all the options from
our dataset with the same maturities (e.g. 37 days and 72 days) and we
discard the options with an implied volatility larger than 70%, an average
price lower than 0.05 or a volume equal to 0. In table 1 we summarized the
number of options that we have for each maturity.
Now, we construct butterfly spreads using the bid-ask prices of the op-
tions. The butterfly spread is formed by two short call options with strike Ki
and long two call with strikes Ki+1 and Ki−1. We divide the dataset and we
construct a butterfly spread for everyday (clearly the butterfly spread must
be symmetric around Ki and the issue time and the maturity time must be
the same for all options). By dividing the dataset for each day we obtain
that the issue and maturity times are the same, we only have to ensure that
there is symmetry around the middle strike. We try to use the smallest
distance possible in the strikes to construct the butterfly spread. Following
the quotation for the SPX we use a difference of 5 points. However, for the
deep-out-of-the-money options we need to take into consideration a larger
distance because there are less options traded. In that case, we arrive to
have spreads of 10 to 50 points. Having a spread of 5 to 50 points does not
impact our probability computation because we adjust it by the spread.
Our methodology to construct butterflies is very simple. We download
the option prices, order by strike, from smallest to largest, we check if the
first three options are symmetric around the second one. If so, we construct
the butterfly, then we take into consideration the second to fourth values and
we check again if they are symmetric around the third, repeating this process
for every value. In this way, we have butterfly spreads which overlap some
options. We repeat the construction of the butterfly spread with the same
maturity for each day available in our dataset.
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At the end of this procedure we get a number of butterfly prices summa-
rized in table 1. In figure 1, we take a day at random from our sample and
we apply equations (21) and (22) to compute the risk-neutral distribution,
the historical distribution and their ratio as the SPD per unit probability.
We take as an example the 11 August 2005, and we look at options with a
maturity equal to 37 days. We see that for one day, the kernel price shows
a monotonically decreasing path in ST with some jumps, because we do not
smooth the results.
[Figure 1 about here]
At this point, we take into consideration the moneyness of each butterfly.
As reference moneyness of the butterfly spread, we use the moneyness of the
middle strike. We round all the butterfly moneyness to the second digit after
the decimal point and we take the average of all the butterfly prices with
equal moneyness.1 In table 1 we summarize the results after this procedure.
At this point we are ready to plot the risk-neutral distribution as an average
of the butterfly prices for a fixed maturity over a twelve year period.
3.3 Historical density
In order to construct the historical density we use a GARCH approach.
Specifically, we use the asymmetric GJR GARCH model. As discussed in
Barone-Adesi et al. (2008), among the several GARCH models, the GJR
GARCH has the flexibility to capture the leverage effect and has the abil-
ity to fit daily S&P500 index returns. Under the historical measure, the




= µ+ t, (23)







where t = σtzt, and zt ∼ f(0, 1), and It−1 = 1 when t−1 < 0, and It−1 = 0
otherwise. The scaled return innovation, zt, is drawn from the empirical
density function f(·), which is obtained by dividing each estimated return
1In order to find an equal moneyness it is necessary to round the moneyness values, to




innovation, ˆt, by its estimated conditional volatility σˆt. This set of esti-
mated scaled innovations gives an empirical density function that incorpo-
rates excess skewness, kurtosis, and other extreme return behavior that is
not captured in a normal density function.
The methodology we use to estimate the historical density is as follows.
We have butterfly prices for each day in the time series of twelve years,
with equal maturity. For each day, we estimate the parameters of the GJR
GARCH using a time series of 3500 returns from the S&P500. Once we get
the parameters for each day, we simulate 35000 paths and we look at the
probability that at maturity we exercise the butterfly. e.g. we count the
number of paths that at maturity are in the range [Ki - Ki−1, Ki + Ki+1] =
l (the length of the interval)2. To compute the probability density under the
historical measure, we apply the following relation:
p =
#of paths in the interval l
total number of paths
l
. (25)
Once we have computed the probability for each day, we can apply the same
methodology we use for the risk-neutral distribution. We round the butterfly
moneyness to the second digit after the decimal point and we take the average
over the sample period.
[Figure 2 about here]
We use the mid-strike for the butterfly and we round the moneyness to
two decimal places. We take the average throughout the time series and we
plot the distribution in respect to the moneyness.
3.4 Kernel price
We apply the definition given in equation 4 in order to get the kernel price.
From previous calculations we obtain the average risk-neutral distribution for
the fixed maturity and also the average historical density. We then discount
this ratio by the risk-free rate. To estimate the average kernel price we take
the kernel price of each day and then we compute the average from all the
2In our sample we use intervals with different lengths: most of them are intervals with
a length of 10 points, but we also have some intervals with 25 or 50 points, and these
intervals are in some cases overlapping
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days in our time series. We compute the average across time because of the
low number of data at each time.
We must keep in mind, throughout the process, that the risk-neutral
distribution and the historical distribution we plotted in figure 2, are not the
same ones we used to derive the kernel price. The kernel price is the average
of the kernel price of each day. The distributions are the average of each day
and therefore have a different kernel price.
[Figure 3 about here]
For all different maturities we get a monotonically decreasing path for
the kernel price and all of these are in accordance with economic theory3.
4 Averaging price kernel over time
In this section we show the robustness of our methodology and we try to
find a smoothness criteria for smoothing our price kernels. First of all, we
show different price kernels with maturity close to the one we showed before.
According to economic theory, closing maturity price kernels should have
similar shape and therefore, averaging closing maturity, could be a good
criteria for smoothing.
The robustness of the methodology comes from the fact the the different
price kernels should be similar. In order to verify this, we create to samples:
the first one has maturities equal to 36, 37, 38 and 39 days. The second one,
71, 72, 73 and 74 days.
We use the approach explained in previous section to derive the price
kernel for a fixed maturity. By this method we derive the price kernels for
the maturities in the two samples and in the following figures we plot the
results of the two samples.
[Figure 4 about here]
The kernel prices show a clearly monotonically decreasing path except in
some points likely to be due to the discretization of the data. In order to
verify that the price kernels are monotonous over time, we plot the kernel
3The presence of some jumps is due to the empirical analysis we compute. In fact, we
do not introduce any smoothing criteria.
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price as the average of different days. In particular, referring to the two
samples (the first one is for maturities equal to 36, 37, 38 and 39 days and
the second sample for maturities equal to 71, 72, 73 and 74 days), we take
the average over the 4 different maturities. We expect to find a kernel price
that is monotonically decreasing in wealth, because of the close maturities
in our sample.
[Figure 5 about here]
As we see in figure 4, the kernel prices close in maturity, have similar
path. This result supports the robustness of our methodology.
In figure 5, we plot the average for the two samples and we get decreasing
kernel prices. In this way we were able to have a sort of smoothing criteria
without using methods which bias our dataset.
5 Price Kernel around a crisis
In this section we evaluate the change of kernel price during a crisis. In
particular, we look at kernel prices before and during a crisis. We divide
our sample in 4 periods. Every period is from 9 to 12 months and we take
periods which show a similar range in volatility according to the VIX index.
5.1 Estimate pricing kernels in different periods
In this subsection we explain how we choose different samples for the period
before and during a crisis. In particular we look at the VIX index, given by
the CBOE.
[Figure 6 about here]
From the VIX index, we can identify four different periods between Au-
gust 2004 and August 2008. The first period is from the 12th of August 2004
to the 15th of September 2005. In this period we can see that the volatility
is between 10 and 20 points. The second period is between 10th of November
2005 to 10th of October 2006. In this second period the volatility is again in a
limited range between 10 to 20 points. The third period, which is before the
crisis period, is between 14th of June 2006 to 14th of June 2007. Even here
the volatility is in a range of 10 to 20 points. The last period, the period
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of the beginning of the crisis is between 11th of October 2007 and 14th of
August 2008. In this period the volatility is much higher and it is in a range
between 10 to 30 points.
[Figure 7 about here]
For each period, we compute the price kernel by the methodology pre-
sented in sections 3 and 4. We fix a maturity (in this case we look at maturity
of 37 days) and we plot the kernel price of each period.
As expected, for the three periods before the crisis we get price kernels
monotonically decreasing and very similar in shape to each other.
[Figure 8 about here]
For the kernel price of the crisis period, we have higher values. This is
exactly what we expected to obtain. The probability of negative outcomes is
more higher and therefore we give more weight to negative outcomes. This
result is quite interesting. It proves how, using a robust method, the problem
arising in Jackwerth (2000) disappear and we still have results consistent with
economic theory.
6 Kernel price as a function of volatility
In this section we would like to extend our model and consider the kernel
price as a function of more variables. In fact, as explained in Chabi-Yo et al.
(2005), one way to overcome the problem of non monotonicity of the price
kernel is consider another factor: the volatility.
In a previous section we compute the price kernel as a function of two
variables: the underlying and the risk-free rate. We know from Pliska (1986),
Karatzas et al. (1987), and Cox and Huang (1989) that the kernel price is
characterized by at least two factors: the risk-free rate and the market price of
risk. In our analysis we would like to consider the kernel price as a function
of three different factors: the risk-free rate, the underlying price and the
volatility. We have already introduce the underlying price and the risk free-
rate. Now we want to introduce also the volatility: mt,T (ST , rf , σ). Because
we look at a price kernel in a two-period model, we are not interested in
looking at the dividends, but an extension with multi-period kernel price
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could be interesting. In that case we should consider another factor: the
dividends.
We have already introduced the underlying price in our kernel price when
we use, as strike price, the moneyness. The moneyness is nothing else then
the k/St. In order to introduce the volatility we take as a reference the idea







where F is the futures price, T is the maturity time and σ is the average
volatility of the index.
For our propose, we can change this formula in:
moneyness =
K
St ∗ σ ,
Time to maturity is constant over the sample we consider because we fix
the maturity at the beginning. Therefore, we do not include the square of the
time in the analysis. Furthermore, the volatility is not anymore the average
volatility, but the implied volatility of each option.
The procedure for derive the kernel price is again the same we have seen
in the previous sections 4 and therefore our result for maturities equal 36,
37, 38 and 39 as well as 71, 72, 73 and 74 are:
[Figure 9 about here]
Also in this case the result are consistent with economic theory. In par-
ticular we can see how the kernel prices for close maturities are very similar
in agreement with what we expected.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposed a method to evaluate the kernel price in a specific day
for a fixed maturity as well as the average of different kernel prices in a time
series of 12 years for a fixed maturity. Using option prices on the S&P 500, we
4There is only a small difference when we round the new moneyness in order to average
different periods. We do not take the second digit after the point, but only the first one.
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derive the risk-neutral distribution through the well-known result in Breeden
and Litzenberger (1978). We compute the risk neutral distribution in each
day where we have options with a fixed maturity.
Then, we compute the historical density, for the same maturity, each day,
using a GARCH method, based on the filter historical simulation technique.
We then compute the ratio between the two probabilities discounted by the
the risk-free rate, in order to derive the kernel price for that given day. We
show that in a fixed day (chosen at random in our sample) the risk-neutral
distribution taken from the option prices respects the no-arbitrage condition
proven in Birke and Pilz (2009).
Therefore, we show that the ratio between the two probabilities, in that
particular day, is monotonically decreasing, in agreement with economic the-
ory (see figure 1). We also show how the average of the different kernel prices
across 12 years display the same monotonically decreasing path (see figure
3).
We also prove that average price kernels over time, if we take closing ma-
turities, exhibit a monotonically decreasing path in agreement with economic
theory.
In the extension of our model, considering the volatility in the kernel
price, the average across several years results more smooth and still coherent
with economic theory.
In the last part, we show the changing in shape of different price kernels
before and during the recent crisis. We see that before the crisis the price ker-
nels are monotonically decreasing with a similar value while during the crisis
the pricing kernel reaches higher values. This is exactly what we expected
to obtain. The probability of negative outcomes is higher and therefore the
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Figure 1: Left: Risk-neutral distribution (black line) and the historical distri-
bution (gray line). We take one day at random from our sample (11 August
2005) with maturity equal to 37 days. Right: SPD per unit probability for
this particular day (11 August 2005).
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Figure 2: Risk neutral and historical distribution as the average of 12 years
risk neutral and historical distribution for a fixed maturity. Left: maturity
equal to 37 days, right maturity equal to 72 days.















































Figure 3: SPD per unit probability as the average of the SPD per unit
probability throughout the time series of 12 years and with equal maturity.
Left: 37 days, right 72 days. It is important to bear in mind that this SPD
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Figure 4: SPD per unit probability for different maturities. Left: from top
to bottom, SPD per unit probability for maturity equal to 36, 37, 38 and 39.
Right: from top to bottom, SPD per unit probability for maturity equal to
71, 72, 73 and 74.
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Figure 5: SPD per unit probability over time. Left: SPD per unit probability
for the first sample (from 36 to 39 days). Right: SPD per unit probability
for the second sample (from 71 to 74 days).













Figure 6: The VIX index between 2nd of January 2004 and 21st of April 2009
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Figure 7: The VIX samples we use to compute the different SPD per unit
probabilities over different years.
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Figure 8: The kernel prices for the four samples we create looking at different
levels of volatility index. The solid line, dot line and the dot-dash line are









Figure 9: SPD per unit probability for different maturities. Left: from top
to bottom, SPD per unit probability for maturity equal to 36, 37, 38 and 39.
Right: from top to bottom, SPD per unit probability for maturity equal to


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































We  test  alternative  models  of  yield  curve  risk  by  hedging  US  Treasury  bond 
portfolios through note/bond futures. We show that traditional implementations of 




errors  substantially  reduces  both  hedging  errors  and  transaction  costs  for  all 
considered  models.  Additionally,  it  leads  to  much  more  stable  weights  in  the 
hedging portfolios and – as a result – to more homogeneous hedging quality. On this 
















flows are often  subject  to  constraints,  so  that  implementing an accurate matching 
might  either  not  be  possible  or  be  very  expensive.  In  these  cases,  immunization 
techniques  are  employed  to manage  yield  curve  risk.  These  techniques make  the 
sensitivity  of  the  assets  and  the  liabilities  to  yield  curve  changes  similar  to  each 
other, so that the overall balance sheet will not be largely affected by these changes. 
Initially, academicians and practitioners focused on the concept of duration ‐ 















Chambers  (1997).  Similarly  as  for  convexity,  most  of  these  models  relied  on  the 
observation  that  further‐order  approximations  of  the  price‐yield  relationship  lead 
to  immunization  strategies  which  are  consistent  with  multi‐factor  processes 
accurately describing actual yield curve shifts. Nawalka et al. (2003) reviewed these 
duration vector (DV) models and developed a generalized duration vector (GDV).  
A  second  class  of  immunization  models  relied  on  a  statistical  technique 
known  as  principal  component  analysis  (PCA)  which  identifies  orthogonal  factors 
explaining the  largest possible proportion of  the variance of  interest rate changes. 
Litterman and Scheinkman (1988) showed that a 3‐factor PCA allows to capture the 
most  important  characteristics  displayed  by  yield  curve  shapes:  level,  slope,  and 




can be  represented as  linear  interpolations of  the  changes  in  a  limited number of 
rates,  the  key  rates.  A  significant  extension  of  this  approach  in  the  presence  of 
restricting constraints was developed by Reitano (1996). 
In practice, yield curve hedging techniques mostly rely on one of these three 






of  the  volatility‐  and  covariance‐adjusted  models  tested  by  Carcano  and  Foresi 











models  should  mainly  depend  on  how  well  the  underlying  stochastic  process 
catches  the actual dynamics of  the yield curve. Accordingly, we extended all  three 
mainstream  immunization  approaches  in  order  to  account  for  model  errors  and 
compared them among themselves and with their traditional implementations. 
We relied on previous evidence that three factors are sufficient to explain the 
vast  majority  of  the  yield  curve  dynamics  and  tested  only  three‐factor  models. 













The  remainder of  the paper  is  organized  as  follows:  section 1  presents  the 
hedging models  we  are  going  to  test  and  their  theoretical  justification.  Section  2 
describes our dataset and  testing approach. Section 3 reports our  results, both on 









of  the  four US T‐note/T‐bond  futures  (the 2‐year,  the 5‐year,  the 10‐year, and  the 












,φ                                                   (1.) 
In our context, the latter constraint implies that the market value of the portfolio to 
be hedged must be equal  to  the market value of  the underlying CTD bonds of  the 
hedging portfolio.  In practice,  the amounts  to be  invested  in  the hedging portfolio 
are often constrained, even though the form of these constraints can differ from the 
last  equation.  Accordingly,  we  felt  that  including  a  constraint  would  make  our 
empirical tests more realistic. 
We  decided  to  analyze  the  quality  of  alternative  hedging  models  on  a 
relatively short hedging horizon, which was set equal to one month. This choice was 
motivated by  the  fact  that many  institutional  investors and portfolio managers do 










excess  of  what  would  have  been  obtained  if  the  promised  yield  had  remained 
constant throughout the hedging period3. 
Approximating the dynamics of the term structure through a limited number 
of  factors  results  in  a  difference  between  the  modeled  and  actual  dynamics  of 
interest rates, the model error. For a generic 3‐factor model of the term structure of 
interest  rates,  we  can  describe  the  dynamics  of  the  zero‐coupon  risk‐free  rate 
R(t,Dk) of maturity Dk as: 
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Estimating  the  sensitivity  of  future  prices  to  changes  in  zero  rates  is more 
complex. In the past, researchers implementing hedging strategies through note and 
bond futures attempted to simplify the problem. One approach has been to calculate 
the sensitivity of  futures  through standard regression analysis  (an example of  this 
approach can be found in Kuberek and Norman (1983)). Such an approach implicitly 










The  theoretical price of a bond  future excluding  the value of  the embedded 
options FP can be represented by the following expression: 






















                  (3.) 
where CF indicates the Conversion Factor, cfCTD,k indicates the cash‐flow paid by the 
cheapest‐to‐deliver  bond  at  time k,  and AICTD,s  represents  the  accrued  interests  of 
the cheapest‐to‐deliver bond on the expiration date s of the future contract. The only 
cash‐flows of  this bond which are relevant  for  the valuation of  the  future contract 
are the ones maturing after the expiration date s.  
Approximating  the effect of  rate  changes on  the price of a zero bond by  its 














































































        (5.) 
for the zero rate with maturity equal to the expiration of the future contract, where 
ωCTD,k,  represents  the  percentage  of  the  CTD  future  price  related  to  the CTD  cash‐
flow with maturity k and is defined based on the last two equations. The sensitivity 




1. The  carry, which we estimated as  the difference between  the yield of  the CTD 
bond  and  the  1‐month  risk‐free  rate  applied  from  the  starting  date  of  the 
hedging period to the expiration of the future contract. The basis net of carry – 
the so‐called net basis – is the sum of the two following components 2 and 3. 




3. The  value  of  the  embedded  options.  As  illustrated  by  Fleming  and  Whaley 
(1994),  future contracts embed 4  types of options. The  first option  is a quality 




For  all  components  of  the  basis,  we  need  to  distinguish  expected  from 
unexpected changes. If the latter changes display a dependency on yield curve shifts, 
this would represent a  further source of  future price sensitivity  to such shifts and 
would influence the optimal hedging strategy. 
For  the  carry,  given  our  focus  on  the  next  expiring  future,  actual  changes 
during  the  hedging  period  are  dominated  by  its  time‐decay.  Accordingly,  we 
estimated this time‐decay as a component of futures expected return and neglected 
unexpected changes due to modifications in the yield curve shape. 
For  the net  basis, we  followed Grieves  et  al.  (2010)  in  the assumption  that 
this value should be expected to be linearly amortized in order to get to zero by the 
contract expiration. An analysis we performed on the average absolute value of the 
net basis  confirmed  that  the hypothesis of a  linear amortization  is  fully consistent 





net  basis  on  changes  in  the  1‐year  risk‐free  rate  for  each  of  the  future  contracts 
without  finding any evidence of  a  statistically  significant dependency5.  This  result 






Rendleman  (2004)  and  Grieves  et  al.  (2010)  highlighted  that  the  value  of  the 
delivery option has a  low impact on hedging strategies based on the next‐expiring 
future contract, when yields are not  too close  to  the notional coupon of  the  future 





















tkykktyt ADDtdRDDtdR ωφψ               (6.) 
where Ai indicates the present value of the bond portfolio cash‐flows included in the 
i­th time bucket.  As in Carcano (2009), we assume that the error terms ε of two zero 
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,,  ,2  (9.) 
The proof of the second order condition of the minimization can be obtained 























The  last  equation  summarizes  the  common  idea  behind  all  traditional 
hedging equations, which is that the sensitivity of the portfolio to be hedged to the 
three  risk  factors  must  be  exactly  replicated  by  the  sensitivity  of  the  hedging 












                                           
(11.) 
The  unconstrained  set  of  equations  (10.)  can  lead  to  high  values  for 
expression  (11.).  This  weakness  of  traditional  hedging  approaches  can  be 
substantially  reduced by  the  error‐adjustment, which  leads  to  a  hedging  portfolio 
minimizing  the  whole  equation  (7.)  and  not  only  its  first  term.  In  the  following 
paragraphs, we explain how we estimated the PCA, DV, and KRD models and recall 
the specific form of equations (10.) for their traditional implementation.  
In  the  case  of  the  PCA model,  the  factors  included  in  equation  (2.)  are  the 
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where  the  factors and  the error  terms have been estimated applying  the ordinary 






A  review  of  the  DV  methodology  is  given  in  Nawalkha  et  al.  (2003)  who 
propose and test a generalization of it. They found out that – for short immunization 
horizons  like  the  one  we  are  going  to  assume  –  a  GDV  model  leading  to  lower 
exponents  for Dk  than  in (14.)  leads to better  immunization. They suggest  that the 
reason  for  this  result  might  be  that  lower  exponents  are  consistent  with  mean 
reverting processes  leading  to higher volatility  for  short‐term rates  than  for  long‐
term rates (a characteristic consistently displayed by yield curve shifts).  
























































































It  should be highlighted  that Nawalkha et  al.  (2003)  tested a  version of DV 
and GDV models  including a minimization of  the squared values of  the weights φy. 
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This  was  motivated  by  the  fact  that  the  number  of  the  hedging  instruments 
exceeded  the hedging  constraints.  This  does not  apply  to  our  case,  since we have 
four  hedging  constraints  (e.g.:  for  the  GDV model,  the  three  constraints  reported 














+≡                                      (17.) 
where  in  this  case  the  factor  Fl  represents  the  l‐th  key  zero  rate  change  and  clk 
represents  the  sensitivity  of  the  zero‐coupon  rate  of  maturity  Dk  to  this  change 
which has been defined following Nawalkha et al. (2005). 
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We  tested  the  alternative  hedging  strategies  on  144  monthly  periods  from 
December 1996  to December 2008. The portfolio  to be hedged  is  formed by 8 US 
Treasury  bonds  and  notes.  We  defined  8  time  buckets  with  maturity  equal  to  – 
respectively  –  2,  4,  6,  8,  10,  16,  20,  and 26 years.  In order  to  select  the  securities 







For  each  contract  and  each  month,  we  identified  the  cheapest‐to‐deliver 
bond following the net basis method. As pointed out by Choundhry (2006), there is 
no  consensus  about  the  best  way  to  identify  the  CTD.  The  two  most  common 
methods rely either on the net basis or on the implied repo rate (IRR).  In academia, 
the second method is the most widely used, while practitioners often argue that the 
net  basis  approach  should  be  used  since  ‐  as  pointed  out  by  Chance  (1989)  ‐  it 
measures  the  actual  profit  and  loss  for  a  cash‐and‐carry  trade.  The  cheapest‐to‐





We extracted all  information related  to US Treasury bonds and notes  (both 
for the securities included in the portfolio to be hedged as well as for the cheapest‐
to‐deliver bonds of the future contracts) from the CRSP database. This included both 




selected  factors, we  calculated  the present  value of  each  individual  cash‐flow.  For 
the  future  contracts,  this  calculation was  based  on  the  cheapest‐to‐deliver  bonds. 
The discount rate we used for this calculation relied on the Unsmoothed Fama‐Bliss 
zero‐coupon rates. The methodology followed for the estimation of these rates has 
been  described  in Bliss  (1997). We used  the  same  set  of  zero  rates  between May 
1975 and December 1996 to estimate the parameters of all tested hedging models.  
We  test  our  hedging  strategies  by  varying  the  weights  invested  in  the  8 
bonds  of  the  portfolio  to  be  hedged.  The  first  3  portfolios  are  identified  as  bullet 
portfolios,  because  the  vast  majority  of  the  bond  positions  matures  in  the  same 
period. For the short bullet, this period is within 5 years; for the medium bullet, it is 
between 8 and 16 years, and for the long bullet it is over 20 years. The other three 













Lower  SEI  indicates  higher  quality  of  the  immunization  strategy.  The  unexpected 
return  of  the  bond  portfolio  is  based  on  the  excess  return  provided  by  the  CRSP 
database  for  the  individual  bonds.  For  the  future  contracts,  the  actual  return  has 
been calculated in two different ways depending if the contract expired during the 




to‐deliver  bond  at  the  end  of  the  expiration month.  The  cheapest‐to‐deliver  bond 
has been identified as the bond with the highest delivery volume based on the actual 
delivery  statistics  provided  by  the  CME.  The  unexpected  return  of  each  future 




  Given  the dependency of different hedging  strategies on  the  same case and 




of  the  hedging  errors  generated  by  two  strategies  on  the  same  case  and  holding 




This  estimate  is  a  useful  proxy  of  the  level  of  transaction  costs  implied  by  each 
hedging  strategy.  In  fact,  these  costs  are  normally  proportional  to  the  sum of  the 
absolute value of all long and short future positions. 
Finally,  we  analyzed  our  dataset  in  order  to  assess  when  market  yields 
should  be  considered  too  close  to  the  notional  coupon  of  the  future  contracts.  As 




not  greater  than  0.5%.  Figure 1 highlights  the  period  during which market  yields 
were within this distance from the notional coupon. It was the period starting  from 
March 2000 (when the notional coupon was lowered from 8% to 6%) and ending in 
June  2004  (when  the market  yield  of  the  30‐year  bond  briefly  touched  the  lower 




Fig. 1. Assessing the distance between the yields of the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year 





0.5% from the notional  coupon of  the  future contracts. When bond yields are within  this area,  the 










After  estimating  the  parameters  of  the  tested  models  between  May  1975  and 
December 1996, we analyzed  the size of  the model errors on the same sample. As 
expected,  all  models  explain  a  high  proportion  of  the  variance  of  interest  rate 
changes, but  this proportion  is slightly higher  for  the PCA model (circa 95%) than 
for the DV model (circa 93%) and the KRD model (circa 92%). The main reason for 
the worse performance of the latter models is their inability to correctly account for 
the  term  structure  of  volatility  (i.e.:  the  higher  volatility  of  short‐term  rates).  The 
GDV model shares this strength of the PCA model and leads to similar model errors. 
   The  results  of  the  strategies  based  on  the  PCA,  DV,  and  KRD  models  are 
reported in Exhibits 1 to 3. For the sake of brevity, we have not reported the results 
provided  by  the  GDV  model  which  led  to  significantly  worse  hedging  than  the 
simpler DV model. This outcome is not consistent with the abovementioned findings 





Exhibit  1  shows  a  comparison  of  the  results  of  the  three methods  in  their 
traditional forms. As expected, these results are puzzling. Even though we know the 
interest rate processes underlying these models to be of a comparable quality, their 
hedging  performance  is  quite  different:  for  the  PCA  model,  the  average  hedging 
56
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error represents  less  than 10% of  the unexpected return volatility we  intended  to 
hedge, whereas  this  ratio  is  substantially  higher  for  the  KRD  and  the DV models. 
Following Carcano (2009), we believe this outcome to be due to a widely different 
exposure  to model errors;  the substantially  lower Squared Weights statistic of  the 
PCA relatively to the other two models suggests that this might indeed be the case. 





























Short Bullet  1.44%  9.12%  **  1.11   10.85% *** 1.18  12.09%  ***  1.38 
Medium Bullet  1.84%  7.85%  **  1.10   9.84%  *** 1.48  11.04%  ***  1.68 
Long Bullet  2.18%  8.47%  *** 1.26   18.69% *** 4.61  20.26%  ***  4.85 
Ladder  1.82%  8.59%  *** 1.14   15.36% *** 2.92  16.88%  ***  3.16 
Barbell  1.81%  9.66%  *** 1.24   21.04% *** 4.41  22.69%  ***  4.58 
Butterfly  1.81%  11.58% *** 1.47   29.27% *** 6.57  30.94%  ***  6.62 
Average  1.81%  9.18%     1.22   17.75%    3.53  19.24%     3.71 
 
Note:  (1)  SEI  (Standard  Error  of  Immunization)  represents  the  average  absolute  value  of  the 
hedging error;  the hedging error  is  the difference between  the unexpected  return of  the bond 
portfolio  to  be  hedged  and  the  unexpected  return  of  the  future  portfolio.  (2)  Statistical 
significance is related to the average difference between the absolute value of the hedging errors 
for the tested strategy and the error‐adjusted PCA: “*” indicates 10% significance, “**” indicates 
5%  significance,  and  “***”  indicates  1%  significance.  (3)  It  indicates  the  square  root  of  the 
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the  squared weights  statistics  obtained  for  the  error‐adjusted models  is  also  very 
substantial, thus highlighting a second important advantage of this adjustment: the 
cut  in  transaction  costs.  If  the  costs  of  setting  up  the hedging  strategy  are  indeed 
proportional  to  our  squared  weights  statistics,  then  the  reduction  in  these  costs 
would be around 50% for the PCA and 80% for the other two models. 
Also,  the  differences  among  the  hedging  performances  of  the  three models 
are  significantly  lower  in  Exhibit  2  than  in  Exhibit  1.  Since  the  quality  of  the 
underlying  interest  rate  processes  is  comparable,  this makes  sense  and  confirms 
that  the  results  reported  in  Exhibit  1  were  influenced  by  widely  different  model 
error  exposures.  However,  the  slightly  superior  quality  of  the  process  of  interest 
rate  changes underlying  the PCA model  systematically  leads  to better hedging: on 

























Short Bullet  8.00%     0.53   9.01%  ***  0.54   8.96%  **  0.54  
Medium 
Bullet 
7.14%     0.62   7.99%  **  0.62   7.83%  *  0.59  
Long Bullet  6.99%     0.75   10.44%  ***  0.91   7.73%  ***  0.73  
Ladder  7.25%     0.60   9.69%  ***  0.67   7.62%  *  0.59  
Barbell  7.74%     0.64   12.08%  ***  0.78   8.67%  ***  0.60  
Butterfly  8.92%     0.80   15.97%  ***  0.98   13.48%  ***  0.62  












cheapest‐to‐deliver  bonds,  instead  of  on  the  future  contracts.  The  purpose  of  this 
exhibit  is  to  provide  us  with  an  attribution  of  the  hedging  error.  In  fact,  the 
difference between the SEI reported in Exhibit 1 (Exhibit 2) and the one reported in 











Traditional(1)   Error‐Adjusted(1)  Traditional(1)   Error‐Adjusted(1)  Traditional(1)   Error‐Adjusted(1) 
Short Bullet  7.55%  4.50%  7.44%  5.40%  9.61%  5.59% 
Medium Bullet  6.29%  4.57%  7.05%  5.64%  8.58%  5.25% 
Long Bullet  6.73%  4.74%  16.69%  7.67%  18.95%  4.89% 
Ladder  6.85%  4.47%  13.06%  6.54%  15.36%  4.35% 
Barbell  7.79%  5.01%  19.16%  8.67%  21.65%  5.53% 
Butterfly  9.50%  6.64%  27.71%  12.67%  30.58%  8.61% 
Average  7.42%  5.00%  15.47%  7.83%  17.75%  5.68% 
 
Note:  (1)  SEI  (Standard  Error  of  Immunization)  as  a  percentage  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
unexpected return from the bond portfolio to be hedged. SEI represents the average absolute value of 
the hedging error. The hedging error  is  the difference between  the unexpected return of  the bond 




This  comparison highlights  that  the  future‐specific hedging error varies  for 
all tested strategies between 1.5% and 3.3% of the total risk we intended to hedge. 




However,  if  a  very high  accuracy of  the  hedging  strategy  is  required,  these 




Accordingly,  it makes sense to analyze the possible sources of  these  future‐
specific hedging errors more in detail. A first possible source is represented by the 
abovementioned  data  quality  issues, which  are  specific  to  our  testing  dataset  and 
would  not  affect  a  real‐life  hedging  problem.  Accordingly,  this  source  of  hedging 
errors makes our strategies based on bond  futures  looking worse  than they really 
are.  Unfortunately,  it  is  impossible  to  estimate  how  much  of  the  future‐specific 
hedging error is due to data quality issues. 
Further  sources  of  future‐specific  hedging  errors  are  represented  by  a 
temporary  mispricing  between  the  spot  and  future  bond  markets  and  by  actual 




Our  sub‐sample  analysis  can  help  us  to  get  a  feeling  for  the  relative 








Traditional(1)   Error‐Adjusted(1) Traditional(1)  Error‐Adjusted(1) Traditional(1)  Error‐Adjusted(1) 
Sub‐Sample 1  Dec. 1996 to Feb. 2000 (Average Net Basis: ‐3.73%)  
Short Bullet  14.49%  12.95%  16.66%  15.11%  19.33%  13.28% 
Medium Bullet  11.93%  10.85%  15.45%  13.77%  18.26%  11.59% 
Long Bullet  12.66%  11.14%  33.76%  18.04%  40.21%  12.42% 
Ladder  13.20%  11.70%  26.50%  16.95%  31.61%  12.26% 
Barbell  14.50%  12.97%  37.45%  19.89%  44.15%  14.22% 
Butterfly  16.24%  14.70%  51.71%  24.30%  61.15%  17.21% 
Average  13.76%  12.31%  30.62%  18.05%  36.24%  13.44% 
Sub‐Sample 2  March 2000 to May 2004  (Average Net Basis: 3.23%)   
Short Bullet  7.07%  6.70%  8.42%  6.50%  9.13%  7.30% 
Medium Bullet  6.49%  6.09%  8.00%  5.82%  8.35%  6.41% 
Long Bullet  6.63%  5.56%  7.68%  6.30%  9.26%  6.86% 
Ladder  6.64%  5.90%  7.88%  6.14%  9.06%  6.53% 
Barbell  7.12%  6.05%  8.50%  7.55%  10.51%  7.53% 
Butterfly  8.40%  6.52%  10.18%  10.01%  12.81%  15.33% 
Average  7.03%  6.10%  8.41%  7.02%  9.83%  8.26% 
Sub‐Sample 3  June 2004 to Dec. 2008  (Average Net Basis: 2.23%) 
Short Bullet  8.03%  6.35%  9.90%  7.98%  10.84%  8.11% 
Medium Bullet  6.80%  5.99%  8.38%  6.77%  9.50%  7.07% 
Long Bullet  7.91%  6.05%  21.06%  10.22%  19.81%  5.91% 
Ladder  7.88%  6.00%  16.49%  9.07%  16.23%  6.01% 
Barbell  9.41%  6.44%  24.17%  12.12%  22.54%  6.64% 
Butterfly  12.04%  8.04%  35.07%  17.07%  31.55%  9.70% 
Average  8.71%  6.48%  19.75%  10.68%  18.88%  7.17% 
 
Note:  (1)  SEI  (Standard  Error  of  Immunization)  as  a  percentage  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
unexpected return from the bond portfolio to be hedged. SEI represents the average absolute value of 
the hedging error. The hedging error  is  the difference between  the unexpected return of  the bond 
portfolio to be hedged and the unexpected return of the future portfolio.  
 
For each sub‐sample, we reported  in Exhibit 4  the average value of  the net 
basis  across  all  future  contracts  and  test  cases.  It  is  visible  that  the quality  of  the 
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the  hedging  quality.  As  a  result,  we  suspect  that  data  quality  issues  and/or 
mispricing are responsible for the largest part of future‐specific hedging errors. 
Moreover,  our  sub‐sample  analysis  highlights  the  robustness  of  the  error 
adjustment and  the  superiority of  the error‐adjusted PCA model:  only  in one case 
(the DV hedging of the butterfly portfolio in the second sub‐sample) the traditional 
model  performs  better  than  the  corresponding  error‐adjusted  one,  whereas  the 
error‐adjusted PCA consistently outperforms the alternative models on average and 
on the vast majority of the portfolios. 
 Finally,  Exhibit  4  highlights  a  problem  related  to  the  traditional 
implementation of the three hedging strategies we already remarked on Exhibit 1: 
their  quality  appears  to  be  extremely  volatile  across  different  models  and  time 
periods.  We  suspected  this  to  be  due  to  an  instability  of  the  solutions  to  their 
















Short Bullet  2.0  0.2  1.7  0.1  1.4  0.1 
Medium Bullet  1.8  0.3  1.5  0.2  1.2  0.1 
Long Bullet  2.2  0.8  1.9  0.3  1.5  0.2 
Ladder  2.1  0.4  1.8  0.2  1.4  0.2 
Barbell  2.4  0.5  2.0  0.3  1.6  0.4 
Butterfly  2.8  0.6  2.4  0.3  2.3  0.3 
Average  2.2  0.5  1.9  0.2  1.6  0.2 
                    
Volatility Weights Sensitivity              









Short Bullet  4.8  0.1  4.9  0.1  4.9  0.0 
Medium Bullet  4.3  0.1  4.5  0.1  4.5  0.1 
Long Bullet  4.6  1.1  4.7  0.2  4.8  0.1 
Ladder  4.6  0.1  4.7  0.1  4.8  0.1 
Barbell  5.0  0.2  5.1  0.1  5.2  0.8 
Butterfly  5.7  0.2  5.9  0.2  6.2  0.1 
Average  4.8  0.3  5.0  0.1  5.1  0.2 
 
Note:  Mean  Weights  Sensitivity  indicates  how  much  the  weighting  of  the  four  future  contracts 
changes on average for a unit change in each of the three PCA coefficients – c1, c2, and c3. Volatility 
Weights Sensitivity indicates the standard deviation of these average changes in the weighting of the 












































































of  the  higher  stability  of  the  error‐adjusted model with  respect  to  the  traditional 
model.  The  mean  sensitivity  across  the  six  bond  portfolios  for  the  traditional 







Stability  could  very  well  be  the  greatest  advantage  of  the  error‐adjusted 









sizable  transaction  costs,  thus  lowering  the  hedging  efficiency.  The  exposure  to 
model  errors  generated  by  these  implementations  varies  quite  randomly  across 
hedging problems, so that the resulting hedging quality is rather heterogeneous. 
As  a  consequence,  including  some  mechanisms  to  control  the  exposure  to 
model  errors  is  of  paramount  importance  for  a  sound  implementation  of  these 









What  is  perhaps  more  important  is  that  the  error  adjustment  makes  the 
optimal weights  of  the  hedging  strategies  far more  stable:  on  average,  traditional 
hedging  models  are  between  5  and  8  times  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  the 
coefficients  than  error‐adjusted models.  This  leads  the  latter models  to  deliver  a  
much more homogeneous hedging quality  across different  time periods  and bond 
portfolios. 





Finally, our study shows  that bond  futures can effectively be used  to hedge 
the  yield  curve  risk  of  a  bond portfolio. When  error‐adjusted models  are  applied, 
only 7.5%‐10% of the risk to be hedged is left as a hedging error (gross of the effect 




All  abovementioned  results  have  been  found  to  be  robust  to  sub‐sample 
analysis  and  to  6  different  structures  of  bond  portfolios.  Our  sub‐sample  analysis 
seems  to  suggest  that  future‐specific  errors  are  more  due  to  data  quality  issues 
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6 For  the PCA model,  this  assumption  is  fulfilled by  construction. Considering  the way how we estimated  the 
error  terms  ε(t,  DK)  for  the  other  models,  this  assumption  is  also  fulfilled  by  construction  as  far  as  the 
independency between the error term and the fitted value of the same zero rate is concerned. For models other 































bonds. Our  results  highlight  a  change  of  regime.  From 2000  to  2007,  a  hedging  strategy 
based only  on T‐bond  futures would  have  reduced  the  variance  of  the  portfolio  by  circa 
83.5%.  This  compares  well  to  the  maximum  variance  reduction  of  50%  reported  by 










Most  institutional  and  private  investors  have  to  face  the  issue  of managing  portfolios  of 
corporate bonds and their risks. Empirical  tests of  the  techniques available  for managing 
these  risks  have  not  been  numerous  so  far;  relatively  more  work  has  been  done  on 
government bonds than on corporate bonds. The sub‐prime crisis of 2008 offered us at the 
same time a strong motivation to improve these risk management techniques and a new set 
of  data  on which  these  techniques  can  be  tested.  These  data  are  particularly  interesting 
because  they  relate  to  exceptional  market  conditions  and  represent  a  realistic  stress‐
scenario. Starting  from this outset, our research had the goal of extending to  investment‐
grade  corporate  bonds  the  most  promising  risk  management  techniques  developed  for 
government bonds and  to  test  their  application  in  the years preceding and  following  the 
sub‐prime  crisis  based  on  a  range  of  different  financial  instruments.  Since  real‐life  bond 
portfolios normally display a high level of issuer diversification, we will focus our analysis 
on systematic, rather than on idiosyncratic risk. 
Hedging  corporate  bond  portfolios  implies  hedging  two  main  sources  of  risk: 
interest rate risk and credit risk1. The first source of risk is related to the dynamics of the 
risk‐free  term  structure  of  interest  rates,  whereas  the  second  source  is  related  to  the 
dynamics of  the  credit  spreads  implicit  in  the  individual bond prices and  to  the  risk of a 
                                                 
1 Depending on their characteristics, corporate bonds can be exposed to a number of other risks, of which liquidity is 
often the most serious one. However, given our focus on large-size issues of plain-vanilla investment-grade bonds, 
we assumed the role of these additional risk factors to be subordinated to interest rate and credit risk. Our results 





Different  techniques  to  hedge  the  risk‐free  term  structure  of  interest  rates  have 
been developed over the past forty years. The techniques most commonly used in practice 
rely  on  one  of  the  following  approaches:  principal  component  analysis  (PCA),  duration 
vector  (DV),  or  key  rate  duration  (KRD).  Ample  literature  exists  on  each  of  these 
approaches. Selected reference papers presenting and motivating these techniques are the 
ones by Litterman and Scheinkman (1988) for PCA, Nawalka et al. (2003) for DV, and Ho 
(1992)  for  KRD.  Nawalka  et  al.  (2005)  provide  an  up‐to‐date  and  accurate  review  of  all 
three  approaches.  Carcano  (2009)  as  well  as  Carcano  and  Dall’O  (2011)  tested  a 
generalized  version of  these  three  approaches  taking  into  account modeling  errors;  they 
show  that  this  generalization  leads  to  important  advantages  both  in  terms  of  hedging 
quality and of transaction costs, while allowing a clear ranking of the three approaches: the 
3‐factor  PCA model  consistently  outperforms  the  other  two  approaches. Accordingly, we 
based our analysis on PCA relying on at least three principal components.    
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  short‐term  immunization  strategies  for  investment‐
grade  bonds.  Since  the  risk  of  a  default  in  the  next  few  weeks  is  negligible  for  an 
investment‐grade bond, we can focus our discussion of the second main source of risk on 
the dynamics of credit spreads. For hedging purposes, the key questions related to this risk 
are:  how  large  is  its  systematic  –  as  opposed  to  the  idiosyncratic  –  component  and how 
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credit  spread  can  be  explained  by  systematic  factors.  However,  Longstaff  et  al.  (2005) 
found  out  that  the  component  of  spreads which  is  not  due  to  expected  default  losses  is 
strongly related to measures of bond‐specific illiquidity such as the bid‐ask spread and the 
outstanding principal amount. Also, a more recent analysis conducted by Ahn et al. (2009) 
relying  on  canonical  correlations  concludes  that  the  spread  is  driven  for  circa  50%  by 
elements  related  to  the  individual  corporate  bonds.  Opinions  are  even more  diversified 
with respect to the second question, that is, the systematic factors underlying the dynamics 















be somehow linked to  liquidity and that  the non‐default component of spreads  is weakly 
related to the tax component. More recently, Longstaff et al. (2005) found out that expected 
default  loss  represents  the  majority  of  corporate  spread  and  that  the  non‐default 
component  is  time‐varying, mean‐reverting  and  does  not  seem  to  be  due  to  taxes.  Even 
though performing a  formalized test of  these opposing theses  is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we will  comment on the evidence with respect  to  these questions which seems  to 
emerge from our results. 




industrials corporate bonds rated as Baa  by Moody’s  can be  reduced by circa 38% using 
only T‐bond  futures, whereas  this  reduction  increases  to 51% if we also use  the S&P500 
futures.  Marcus  and  Ors  (1996)  found  out  that  returns  of  lower‐rated  bonds  are  more 








constant hedge ratio across  the  full business cycle  leads  to almost no variance reduction. 
The inconsistency with the findings of Grieves (1986) is due to the significant difference in 
the  analyzed  time  periods:  1982  –  1994  for  Marcus  and  Ors  (1996),  1982  –  1985  for 
Grieves (1986). However, if a Consumer Confidence Index below its historic mean is used 
to  identify  periods  of  pessimism  and  if  the  strategy  including  the  S&P500  futures  is 
calibrated and used only during these periods, the variance reduction for portfolios of Baa‐
rated  bonds  increases  to  49%.  These  results  highlight  that  the  S&P500  futures  can  –  in 
combination  with  T‐bond  futures  –  lead  to  a  significant  variance  reduction.  However, 




contracts  –  have  been  increasingly  used  to  hedge  credit  spread  risk.  Accordingly,  we 
considered necessary for our research to include CDS in the framework of the considered 
hedging  strategies.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  paper  to  attempt  an 
empirical  test  of  hedging  strategies  combining  T‐bond  futures  and  CDS  contracts.  Given 
that CDS  total  return  indices  are mostly  still  in development,  the use of CDS  for hedging 






other.  Unfortunately,  the  recent  crisis  showed  that  this  convergence  is  not  guaranteed 
during exceptional market conditions: the basis, that is the difference between CDS spreads 
and bond spreads with equal maturity and underlying entity, is close to zero during regular 
market  conditions,  but  became  strongly  negative  during  the  sub‐prime  crisis.  Fontana 
(2010)  presents  empirical  evidence  suggesting  that  counterparty  risk  and  overall 
shrinkages  in  capital  market  liquidity  appear  to  have  been  the  key  drivers  of  this 
phenomenon, whereas specific  illiquidity  in the corporate bond market –  identified as an 


















–  219  –  which  is  sufficient  for  adequate  sub‐sample  analyses.  In  fact,  we  tested  the 
alternative  hedging  strategies  on  three  different  sub‐samples:  the  first  sub‐sample  goes 
from September 2000 to December 2004, the second sub‐sample goes from January 2005 
to  December  2007,  whereas  the  last  sub‐sample  goes  from  January  2008  to  December 
2009. 
Carcano  (2009)  as  well  as  Carcano  and  Dall’O  (2011)  recently  analyzed  the 
performance of alternative strategies  for hedging government bonds.  In order  to provide 
empirical evidence of general relevance for investment‐grade corporate bonds, we decided 
to  analyze  alternative  strategies  for  hedging  bonds  rated  as  BBB  by  S&P.  Given  the 
relatively  high  correlation  of  credit  spread  changes  among  investment‐grade  bonds, 





full  term  structure  of  interest  rates,  we  built  corporate  bond  portfolios  composed  from 
eight BBB‐rated bonds issued in US$ by different companies. Following Eom et al. (2004), 
we  did  not  consider  issuers  belonging  to  the  financial,  utility  and  energy  sectors.  We 
defined eight time buckets with maturity equal to – respectively – 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 16, 20, and 
26  years.  At  the  beginning  of  each  year,  we  selected  the  bonds  to  be  included  in  the 
portfolio based on three conditions: a publicly held face value outstanding of at  least 100 
million US$, an already‐paid first coupon and a maturity as close as possible to the one of 
the  corresponding  time  bucket3.  Furthermore, we  selected  only  fixed‐rate  coupon  bonds 
which did not  include any embedded options and paid a regular coupon every 6 months. 
Finally, we selected bonds which ‐ during the year ‐ were not subject to any rating upgrade 
or  downgrade,  so  that  their  market  benchmark  could  still  be  represented  by  one  yield 
curve: the term structure of BBB‐rated bonds. The results reported by Carcano (2009) as 
well  as  by Carcano  and Dall’O  (2011)  highlight  that  hedging quality measured on  ladder 
(i.e.:  equally‐weighted)  bond  portfolios  is  representative  of  average  hedging  quality 
measured on a number of different bond portfolio structures. Also, these results highlight 
that  ranking  of  error‐adjusted  hedging  strategies  does  not  depend  on  individual  bond 
weightings.  Accordingly,  we  focused  on  equally‐weighted  portfolios  of  the  eight  bonds 
selected at the beginning of each year. 






For  all  financial  instruments  included  in  our  tests,  we  need  to  estimate  the 
unexpected returns. In general, these estimates rely on the assumption that all considered 
interest rates are martingales. Past studies have reported that the overall effect on hedging 














Zero‐coupon  as well  as  par  yield  curves  for BBB‐rated bonds  issued by  industrial 
companies  have  been provided by Bloomberg.  The  3‐month,  1‐year,  5‐year,  10‐year,  20‐






year,  and  30‐year  zero  rates  have  been  used  to  estimate  the  PCA  parameters;  linear 




The  first  type  of  hedging  instruments we  tested  is  represented  by  the  four  US  T‐
bond and T‐note  futures contracts with denomination of – respectively – 2, 5, 10, and 30 
years. We always referred to the next expiring futures contract. For each contract and each 
month,  we  identified  the  cheapest‐to‐deliver  bond  following  the  net  basis  method5  and 
relying  on  the monthly  baskets  of  deliverable  bonds  and  conversion  factors  (CF)  kindly 
provided to us by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The closing price of the futures 
contracts has been provided by Datastream. 
For  these  futures  contracts,  we  calculate  the  actual  return  in  two  different  ways 
depending  if  the  contract  expires  during  the  hedging  period  or  not.  In  the  case  of  no‐











deliver  bond  as  the  bond with  the  highest  delivery  volume  based  on  the  actual  delivery 







the  CRSP  database.  This  included  both mid  prices  and  reference  data.  On  this  basis, we 
calculated  the  present  value  of  each  individual  cash‐flow  using  the  US  Treasury  zero‐
coupon  rates  estimated  through  the  Unsmoothed  Fama‐Bliss  methodology  described  in 
Bliss (1997). The 3‐month, 1‐year, 3‐year, 5‐year, 7‐year, 10‐year, 15‐year, 20‐year, and 30‐
year  zero  rates  have  been  used  to  estimate  the  PCA parameters;  linear  interpolations  of 
these rates have been used to discount the bond cash‐flows to their present value. The 5‐









multiplied  by  the  year  fraction  corresponding  to  each  hedging  period. We  assumed  the 
equity  risk premium to be  constant and estimated  it over a  long  time horizon  (from  July 




(series number 3  to number 13) have been downloaded  from Bloomberg.  In order  to be 
able to use the CDX index to hedge our corporate bond portfolio, we needed to convert the 
CDX  spread  (which  is  how  the  CDX  is  traded  in  the  market)    into  a  return.  For  this 
conversion,  we  relied  on  the  ISDA  CDX  standard model,  whose  theoretical  derivation  is 
described  in  O’Kane  and  Turnbull  (2003).  According  to  this  model,  the  Cash  Settlement 
Amount  (CSA)  is  the  amount  paid  by  the  protection  buyer  to  the  protection  seller  on  an 
assumed cash settlement date of trade‐date plus 3 business days. In the CSA calculation, the 










estimated  the  unexpected  return  provided  by  the  CDX  contract  to  the  protection  buyer 
during  a  certain  period  as  the  change  in  the  upfront.  Therefore,  the  time  series  of 
unexpected returns for the 5‐year CDX contract has been constructed as the change in the 
upfront calculated on the on‐the‐run series6. Within our data sample, no credit events took 
place on  the on‐the‐run series  for  the 5‐year CDX.NA.IG. Accordingly, we did not have  to 
consider the additional complexity linked to the existence of multiple versions of the same 
series7. For the same reason, we did not have to include in the performance calculation any 





We  intend  to  immunize  a  portfolio  composed  from  eight  BBB‐rated  bonds 
denominated  in  USD  against  market  risk.  We  define  market  risk  as  the  risk  of  an 













above,  we  assume  that  all  interest  rates  are martingales;  accordingly,  all  changes  in  the 
term structure are considered  to be unexpected. Moreover, as reported among others by 
Hodges  and  Parekh  (2006),  the  impact  of  monthly  rate  changes  on  the  price  of  a  zero‐
coupon bond can be well‐approximated by its duration. Since our hedging periods normally 
extend over 15 days, we will follow this simplifying approach. 
In  order  to  estimate  the  sensitivity  of  a  certain  bond  to  yield  curve  changes,  we 
decompose the present value of the bond into the present value of its cash‐flows calculated 
based  on  the  appropriate  zero‐coupon  yields:  the  symbol  ⍵i(t,Dk)  indicates  the  present 
value of bond i cash‐flow with maturity Dk as a percentage of its total present value at time 
t.  Within  this  context,  we  approximate  the  unexpected  return  provided  by  a  certain 
corporate bond i from time t to time t+Δt as:  
















































In  order  to  define  the  unexpected  return  provided  by  the  y­th  T‐bond  futures 
contract we relied on the approach presented by Carcano and Dall’O (2011), who claim that 

































need  to  take  into account any  idiosyncratic  return because  the methodology we adopted 















































































        (5) 
for the zero rate with maturity equal to the expiration of the futures contract (i.e.: the zero 
rate  affecting  the  cost‐of‐carry).  In  the  last  two  equations,  CF  indicates  the  Conversion 
Factor  and  cfCTD,k  indicates  the  cash‐flow paid  by  the  cheapest‐to‐deliver  bond  at  time k. 
Because of the definition of T‐bond futures contracts, the sensitivity of the futures price to 
changes in zero rates maturing before the futures contract is zero, which implies: ωCTD,k,t = 
0 for all k < s. 
Similarly  to  corporate  bond  yields,  the  stochastic  process  driving  risk‐free  zero‐
coupon yields can be represented as follows: 
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futures  contract.  In  the  next  sub‐sections,  we  will  show  how  we  calculated  the  optimal 
weights  for  each  strategy  starting  from  this  set  of  sensitivity  equations  and  stochastic 
processes. 
B. Hedging through T­Bond Futures   
In  the  case of  this hedging strategy,  the hedging portfolio  is exclusively  composed 
from T‐bond futures. Accordingly, we set the number of the considered risk factors L also 
equal  to  four  (the need  for  this  setting will  become  clear  as  soon  as we will  present  the 
resulting system of equations). Also, we assume that the dynamics of these risk factors are 
independent from each other; since we are going to identify these dynamics through PCA, 
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(8) 
where Ai represents the amount invested in bond i and φy represents the optimal weight to 
be  invested  in  the  y­th  futures  contract.  The  latter  weights  shall  be  interpreted  as  the 
market value of the underlying CTD bonds. Now, if we assume that the modeling errors εBBB 
and εRF as well as  the  idiosyncratic bond returns εi are  independent  from each other and 
from the risk factors F, the partial derivatives of the variance of the unexpected return with 
respect to the optimal weight φy can be approximated by the following expression:  
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                           (11) 
In  order  to  implement  this  hedging  strategy,  we  estimated  the  sensitivity 





we  solve  the  system of  equations  (11)  based on  current  values of  the  risk‐free  and BBB 
zero‐coupon yield curves. The resulting optimal weights are applied for the hedging period 
and  then  re‐calculated  in  the  same  way  at  the  beginning  of  the  following  period.  This 
approach  ensures  a  rigid  out‐of‐sample  testing  framework.  For  each  period,  we  then 
calculate  the  hedging  error  as  the  sum  of  the  unexpected  return  provided  by  the  bond 






which can also be conceived as  the unexpected return of  the hedged portfolio,  is  the key 
indicator on which we will base the analysis of our results in the next section. 
For  each  period,  we  also  estimated  the  optimal  weights  of  the  traditional  PCA 
hedging strategy simply by setting the matrix Ωε  equal to a matrix of zeros. In fact, Carcano 
(2009)  highlighted  that  traditional  PCA  hedging  is  a  special  case  of  error‐adjusted  PCA 
hedging when the modeling errors are zero. 
C. Hedging through T­Bond Futures and S&P500 Futures 
This  hedging  strategy  implies  that  the  hedging  portfolio  includes  the  four  T‐bond 
futures as well as the S&P500 futures. Accordingly, the equation of the overall unexpected 
return now becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )

























































Obviously,  in  this  case  the number of  considered principal  components  increases  to  five. 
Also,  the  time series of  the unexpected  returns provided by  the S&P500  futures must be 
added to the data set underlying the PCA described for the previous hedging strategy. Some 
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Moreover,  the matrix ΩF now becomes a (5x5) matrix  in order to  include the variance of 
the  fifth  principal  component  and  the  matrix  CBBB  becomes  a  (5xn)  matrix  in  order  to 
include  the  sensitivity  coefficients  to  the  fifth  component.  On  this  basis,  the  optimal 
hedging weights are still represented by equation (11). 




































Relying  on  previous  research  cited  in  the  introduction  as  well  as  on  our  own 
findings,  we  decided  to  apply  this  hedging  strategy  only  when  the  level  of  consumer 
confidence  is  below  its  historic mean.  Accordingly, we  estimated  the  coefficients  for  the 
years 2000‐2005 (2005‐2009) on all periods from 1995 to 2000 as well from 2005 to 2009 
(2000‐2005)  at  the  beginning  of  which  the  consumer  confidence was  below  its  historic 
mean. We applied  these  coefficients  to  the hedging periods  from 2000  to 2005  (2005  to 
2009) at the beginning of which the consumer confidence was below its historic mean. For 
all other hedging periods, we applied the previous hedging strategy relying only on T‐bond 





one‐stage  optimization:  the  CDS  should  be  included  in  alternative  to  the  S&P500 within 
equation (12), its coefficients should be estimated in a joint PCA with all other coefficients 
and  used  in  the  identical  way  described  in  sub‐section  II.C.  for  the  S&P500  futures.  In 
practice,  available  historical  data  are  still  insufficient  to  implement  this  approach.  There 
are  two  reasons  for  that.  Firstly,  daily  CDX  data  are  only  available  starting  from  2005. 




materialized  only  during  2008  and  2009.  This  makes  a  robust  estimate  of  the  PCA 
coefficients virtually impossible. 
The  second  approach  relies  on  a  two‐stage  optimization:  in  the  first  stage,  the 
optimal weights  for  the  T‐bond  futures  are  calculated  as  in  II.B.  Thereafter,  the  hedging 
errors are linearly regressed on the return of the CDX. Formally, we have: 
tCDXtCDXtFUT eRe ,,, ++= βα                                                        (13) 




Since  the  hedging  errors  are  expressed  as  percentage  of  the market  value  of  the 
bond portfolio, the optimal notional of the CDX contracts resulting from the last regression 
















spread  forwards. The rational  for  the  test of  this strategy  is  to have a benchmark  for  the 
performance  of  the  previous  strategy  based  on  the  CDX  contract.  Since  we  know  from 
previous academic research and empirical evidence that the dynamics of CDS do not always 
coincide  with  the  dynamics  of  bond  spreads,  we  intend  to  verify  the  impact  of  these 
discrepancies  on  the  hedging  quality.  Credit  spread  forwards  are  derivative  contracts 
whose  underlying  is  the  bond  credit  spread  itself.  Accordingly,  they  represent  the  ideal 
benchmark for our analysis. 
A  drawback  of  using  credit  spread  forwards  for  empirical  analyses  is  that  these 
instruments  are  rather  illiquid  and  reliable  time  series  of  their  prices  are  not  available. 
However,  if we assume adequate collateralization of  these contracts so  that counterparty 
risk is not an issue, their prices can be calculated based on available market data and non‐
                                                 
9 We excluded one every ten subsequent observations. For example, in the first sub-sample, we excluded the first 
observation, the eleventh observation, the twenty-first observation and so on. In the second sub-sample, we excluded 
the second observation, the twelfth observation, the twenty-second observation and so on. 
102
  101








































           
(14) 
which is simply the difference between the two forward rates. Of course, in the analysis of 
the  results,  we  need  to  consider  that  these  represent  theoretical  –  rather  than  actually 
traded ‐ forward spreads. However, we believe that this is a reasonable approximation for 
benchmarking the strategy involving CDX contracts.  
Accordingly, we  estimated 5‐year  credit  spread  forwards  for  contracts  expiring  at 
the  end  of  our  2‐week  hedging  period  as  described  in  the  last  equation.  Even  though 
historical data to perform a one‐stage optimization of this strategy are available, this would 
represent  a  substantial  modeling  difference  compared  with  our  implementation  of  the 
strategy  involving  CDX  contracts.  Since  we  intend  to  compare  the  results  of  these  two 
strategies,  we  decided  to  implement  both  of  them  based  on  a  similar  two‐stage 
optimization. As a result, we estimated the following linear regression: 





The  last  regression  is  based  on  the  standard  cash  settlement  of  credit  spread 
forwards,  which  –  for  one  unit  of  notional  ‐  is  given  by  the multiplication  of  the  Credit 
Spread  Duration10  and  the  difference  between  the  traded  forward  spread  and  the  spot 
spread observed on the forward expiration date. The estimation of β and the calculation of 




Before  discussing  the  results  provided  by  the  alternative  hedging  strategies, we  analyze 
some relevant statistics related to the bonds composing the portfolio to be hedged as well 
as  the  market  yield  curve  of  BBB‐rated  bonds.  In  particular,  we  consider  the  level  of 
correlation among the individual bonds composing the portfolio to be hedged and between 
this  portfolio  and  the  corporate  bond  market.  All  our  hedging  strategies  have  been 
calibrated on the dynamics of the corporate bond market and three of the tested strategies 
include a financial instrument linked to an average credit spread representing this market. 
Accordingly,  this  correlation  analysis  can  be  instructive  in  order  to  interpret  the  results 
obtained by the tested strategies.  
                                                 
10 The exact definition of the Credit Spread Duration may vary from one contract to the other, but normally refers to 
the expiration date of the forward contract. For our purposes, we calculated this parameter as the mean value of the 
durations of the two 5-year bonds constructed on the corresponding BBB and risk-free par rates at the beginning of 




the portfolio  to  be  hedged  for  each  considered  calendar  year.  It  leaves  us with  the  clear 
impression that these bonds largely moved together between 2001 and 2007, whereas this 
was far less the case in 2008 and 2009: the average correlation was 66% in the first seven 
years and only 30%  in  the  last  two years.  In  the  introduction, we summarized  some key 
contributions to the debate about the number of factors driving the dynamics of the credit 
spread. Performing a  formalized  test of  the alternative hypotheses animating  this debate 
goes beyond the scope of  the present paper. However, since  the focus of  this paper  is on 
hedging market  –  in  opposition  to  idiosyncratic  –  risk,  an  estimation  of  the  relevance  of 














the  time  periods  are  by‐weekly,  there  are  24  observations  for  each  of  the  reported  years.  The  average 
correlation  has  been  calculated  as  a  simple  arithmetic  average  of  the  correlations  between  each  of  the  28 
possible pairs composed from the eight bonds. 
 
A  confirmation  that  the  lower  correlation  in  2008  and  2009  is  mostly  due  to 
idiosyncratic risk comes from the results of regressing the unexpected returns of the bond 
portfolio on the market yield curve of BBB‐rated bonds. The R2 statistic of these regressions 
is also  reported  in Table  I and shows  that 75% of  the unexpected return variance  is  still 
explained by market risk. Even though this is circa 8% less than between 2000 and 2007, 
such a proportion highlights  that  it  is  sufficient  to  combine a  few bonds  in a portfolio  to 
rapidly  diversify  away  the  dynamics  of  individual  bonds,  thus  indicating  that  most  risk 
106
  105
during  this  period  was  indeed  idiosyncratic.  Since  our  hedging  strategies  assume  that 
idiosyncratic  bond  returns  are  independent  from  market  returns,  they  should  not  be 











the BBB zero‐rates with maturity 5‐year,  10‐year,  and 20‐year. The  fifth  column  reports  the R2  statistic of 
linearly regressing the average change in all considered BBB zero‐rates on the changes in the risk‐free zero‐
rates with maturity 5‐year,  10‐year,  and 20‐year.  The  sixth  column  reports  the  average  ratio  between  the 






























1995‐Sep. 2000  75.5%  30.2%   87.8% 27.2%
Oct. 2000 ‐ 2007  65.0%  37.0% 83.8% 83.5% 26.8%








each other during subsequent periods. On the contrary,  if  this autocorrelation  is positive, 
hedging errors tend to add up to each other during subsequent periods, thus amplifying a 
loss  or  a  profit  over  several  time  periods.  In  most  business  environments,  the  latter 













indicates  2.5%  statistical  significance,  whereas  ***  indicates  1%  statistical  significance.  The  statistical 
significance  related  to  the  variance  reduction  has  been  estimated  following  a  matched  pair  experiment 
approach: the inference refers to the average difference between the absolute value of the hedging error for 



















Portfolio Variance  R2 of Hedging Error Variance Variance  Variance
Period  Variance Reduction  on Spread Changes Reduction Reduction  Reduction
2000‐2004  0.015% 82.3%  0.6% 76.8%      
2005‐2007  0.008% 84.7%  0.0% 84.0%      
2008‐2009  0.035% 23.5%  49.8% (***) 26.1% 30.2%  64.3%(**)
 
We  implemented both  the  traditional version and  the version  including  the error‐
adjustment  for  each  of  the  four  tested  strategies.  Consistently  with  Carcano  and  Dall’O 
(2011),  the  results  we  obtained  for  the  traditional  version  of  the  strategies  were 
systematically  worse  than  the  ones  obtained  for  the  version  including  the  error‐
adjustment. However, we observed that traditional strategies often led to implausible long‐
short  positions  in  the hedging  instruments  and –  as  a  consequence‐  to  far worse  results 




be  responsible  for  this  outcome. Accordingly,  for  the  sake  of  brevity, we  report  only  the 








level  of  variance  reduction  is  substantially  higher  than  the  one  reported  by  previous 
studies  on  this  subject  and  is  largely  consistent  between  the  two  analyzed  sub‐periods. 
Also, Table III reports a negative autocorrelation of order one for the hedging errors of this 
strategy  before  the  crisis,  which  strengthens  the  evidence  about  the  usefulness  of  this 
immunization approach. 
We can explain the above result by looking at some of the figures reported in Table I. 
Particularly,  83.5% of  the  dynamics  of  the  yield  curve of  BBB‐rated bonds  from 2000  to 





2007  was  explained  by  risk‐free  rates.  Carcano  and  Dall’O  (2011)  reported  that  error‐
adjusted  PCA  strategies  relying  on  four  T‐bond  futures  contracts  can  almost  perfectly 
hedge the risk related to the risk‐free yield curve, so that the very good performance of this 
hedging strategy between 2000 and 2007 should not be surprising. We would expect the 
vast majority of  the residual variance of  the hedged portfolio  returns  (16.5% of  the  total 
variance  to  be  hedged)  to  be  due  to  idiosyncratic  returns  of  the  individual  bonds.  This 




are  mainly  due  to  idiosyncratic  returns  of  the  individual  bonds  has  two  important 
implications.  Firstly,  corporate  bond  portfolios  which  display  a  higher  level  of 
diversification  than our  equally weighted  8‐bond portfolio  can plausibly be hedged  even 
more effectively. Secondly, strategies attempting to hedge against changes in the corporate 
bond spread are unlikely to obtain any improvements over a simpler strategy relying only 
on  T‐bond  futures  during  the  considered  period,  also  because  Table  I  highlighted  that 
credit  spreads of different maturity moved up  to a  large extent  independently  from each 

























2000‐2004  1.3%  ‐10.3%  ‐13.2%     
2005‐2007  1.3%  ‐20.0%  ‐20.5%     




also  the  autocorrelation  of  the  hedging  error  stops  being  negative.  A  positive 
autocorrelation of 70.4%  implies  that hedging errors  tend  to cumulate over  time,  so  that 
losses tend to be followed by other losses. Considering that the unexpected returns of the 
unhedged  bond  portfolio  display  a  substantially  lower  level  of  autocorrelation  than  the 
hedging  errors  and  the  small  variance  reduction,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  the  hedged 
portfolio is preferable to the unhedged portfolio during this period. 
Two  questions  arise  from  the  observation  we  just  made:  why  does  hedging 
corporate bonds through T‐bond futures stop making sense in this period and under which 
conditions  is  this  likely  to  happen  again  in  the  future?  The  answer  to  the  first  question 
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seems  to  be  simpler:  the  dynamics  of  the  credit  spread  which  are  not  hedged  by  this 
strategy played a crucial role in 2008 and 2009. Clear evidence of this is provided by the R2 
statistic reported in Table II which highlights a highly statistically significant relationship 
between  the  hedging  error  and  the  credit  spread  during  this  period.  The  origin  of  this 





we  notice  that  positive  (negative)  changes  have  been mostly  followed  by  other  positive 















Answering  the  second  question  above  is  more  difficult.  If  we  analyze  BBB  credit 





latter  tension  can  plausibly  be  expected  to  lead  to  sudden  and  remarkable  shifts  in  the 
credit spreads. Accordingly, strategies hedging corporate bond risk should attempt to also 
hedge  systematic  credit  spread  risk  during  such  periods.  However,  we  realize  that  this 
answer  has  rather  the  character  of  anecdotic  evidence  than  of  a  rigorous  proof.  More 
comprehensive  empirical  analyses  of  other  countries  and  time  periods  could  perhaps 
provide us with a sounder evidence on the conditions under which it is important to hedge 
systematic credit spread risk. For our purposes, we will assume that this was the case only 
in 2008 and 2009 and  test  the performance of alternative hedging strategies  focusing on 
systematic  credit  spread  risk  during  this  period.  Their  results  will  be  analyzed  in  the 
following paragraphs. 
B. Hedging through T­Bond Futures and S&P500 Futures   
The  results  reported  in  Table  II  and  Table  III  highlight  that  the  differences  in 













only  during  these  phases  the  credit  spread  and  the  S&P500  seem  to  be  significantly 
correlated  to each other. This  implies  that  in circa 40% of our  test  cases before  the  sub‐













We  conclude  that  the  relationship  between  the  equity  market  and  the  corporate 
bond  spread  seems  to  be  too  loose  to  allow  a meaningful  use  of  equity‐related  financial 
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instruments  in hedging  corporate bond  risk.  In  the next  sub‐section, we will  analyze  if  a 
derivative  explicitly  constructed  on  the  credit  risk  of  BBB‐rated  corporate  bonds  is  of 
greater use for this purpose, as we would expect.    
C. Hedging through T­Bond Futures and Credit Default Swaps   
Considering  the  evidence  reported  above  on  the  lack  of  relationship  between 
hedging  errors  and  credit  spread  changes  before  the  sub‐prime  crisis,  we  decided  to 
include  the  5‐year  Investment  Grade  CDX  contract  in  the  hedging  portfolio  only  during 
2008 and 2009. We decided to include only one hedging instrument for the credit spread 
because  –  as  reported  in  Table  I  –  when  the  dynamics  of  this  spread  really  need  to  be 
hedged,  all  points  along  the  term  structure  of  credit  spread  are  very  strongly  correlated 
with each other. Accordingly, hedging this term structure with only one instrument should 




futures,  both  in  term of  variance  reduction  and  of  autocorrelation  dampening. However, 
the  improvement  is  much  smaller  than  one  would  plausibly  expect.  If  we  consider  the 
abovementioned  benchmark  of  75.5%  for  the maximum  variance  reduction,  we  have  to 
admit  that  a  value  of  30.2%  cannot  be  considered  too  favorably.  Not  surprisingly,  the 








Figure  2  can  help  us  to  answer  this  question.  In  this  figure,  the  line  titled  Difference 
represents the difference between the CDX spread and the bond spread, that is, the spread 
between  BBB‐rated  corporate  bond  rates  and  risk‐free  rates.  Since  changes  in  the  CDX 
spread  determine  the  CDX  performance  and  this  performance  should  hedge  against 
changes in the bond spread, if the CDX spread and the bond spread move apart from each 
other  the  hedging  quality  cannot  be  very  high.  The  line  titled  Difference  in  Figure  2 
highlights that during 2008 and the first part of 2009, the CDX premium reacted less than 
proportionally  to  the  increase  in  the  corporate  bond  spread.  During  the  second  part  of 
2009, the CDX premium reacted less than proportionally to the decrease in the corporate 










basket  and  –  as  suggested  by  Blanco  et  al.  (2005)  ‐  the  corresponding  swap  rate.  The 
underlying bond basket of  the  Investment Grade CDX does not only consist of BBB‐rated 
bonds  issued  by  industrial  companies:  it  includes  also  A‐rated  bonds  and  non‐industrial 
companies.  The  difference  between  the  CDX  spread  and  the  appropriate  bond‐to‐swap 
spread  (considering  the  composition of  the underlying CDX   basket)  is  the  so‐called CDX 
basis and represents the remaining dynamics of the line titled Difference in Figure 2. 
In order  to assess  the relevance of  these  two explanatory  factors, we estimate  the 






the  CDX  basis  in  2008  and  2009  systematic  or  idiosyncratic?  Were  they  economically 
justified,  so  that  we  should  expect  to  see  similar  dynamics  in  the  future?  Or  were  they 
                                                 
11 For estimating the CDX basis, we needed an estimate of the yield of the CDX bond basket. We calculated this 
yield as a weighted average of the 5-year BBB and A par rates, where the weights corresponded to the rating 
allocation displayed by each CDX series. The bond-to-swap spread was obtained by subtracting the 5-year swap rate 
from the yield of the CDX bond basket.   
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related  to  exceptional  market  inefficiencies  which  are  unlikely  to  happen  again?  In  the 








bond spread  to move  together.  In  fact,  an arbitrageur could  take advantage of a negative 
CDS  basis  by  financing  the  acquisition  of  the  bond  at  the  risk‐free  rate  and  buying 
protection through a CDS:  if  the cost of the protection  is  lower than the bond spread, the 
arbitrageur would obtain a positive and riskless return. However, two problems made this 
kind of arbitrage cumbersome during the crisis. Firstly, finding cheap money to finance the 
acquisition of  the bonds was not  easy. This  issue was more  serious  for  single‐name CDS 
than  for  our  CDX  contract,  tough:  even  during  the  crisis,  the  collateral  value  of  a  well‐
diversified basket  of  investment‐grade bonds was  relatively high.  Secondly,  the dramatic 
increase in counterparty risk led the risk for the protection buyer to increase much more 
than for the protection seller: during a generalized credit crunch, the default correlation of 
the protection  seller  (normally,  a  bank) with  the bond  issuers  drastically  increases,  thus 
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making more  likely  that  the  protection  seller will  not  honor her  duties  on  the  CDS. As  a 
result of the increased counterparty risk, the negative‐basis trade is far from being riskless 
for  the  arbitrageur:  the  negative  basis  simply  represents  a  compensation  for  this  risk. 
Accordinlgy, we agree with Fontana  (2010)  that  this phenomenon was not  signaling any 
market inefficiency. In the case of our CDX contract, we are convinced that the increase in 
counterparty risk was the most important reason which led the negative basis to develop 
and  persist  during  the  crisis  and  finally  caused  the  hedging  strategy  under  analysis  to 
underperform.  
D. Hedging through T­Bond Futures and Credit Spread Forwards 
If  the hypothesis described  in  the  last sub‐section  is correct, we should see a very 
significant  improvement  in  hedging  quality  by  using  credit  derivatives  which  are  not 
subject  to  counterparty  risk.  In  order  to  test  if  this  is  indeed  the  case,  we  assumed  the 
existence of  fully  collateralized  credit  spread  forwards on  the 5‐year BBB par  rates.  The 
credit  spreads  forwards  have  been  calculated  using  the  5‐year  par  Treasury  rate  as  a 
benchmark and the pricing framework described in Section II.   
The  results  provided  by  this  hedging  strategy  are  reported  in  the  last  column  of 
Table  II  and  Table  III.  They  show  indeed  a  substantial  improvement  compared with  the 
strategy  involving  the CDX contract:  the variance  reduction now amounts  to 64.3%,  thus 








of  the  dynamics  of  this  term  structure.  Also,  Carcano  and  Dall’O  (2011)  showed  that 
hedging  based  on  four  T‐bond  futures  is  normally  very  effective  in  removing  the  US 
Treasury  term  structure  risk.  However,  they  reported  above‐average  hedging  errors  in 
2008  which  are  likely  to  be  due  to  the  exceptional  market  conditions  experienced 
immediately  before  and  after  the  bankruptcy  of  Lehman  Brothers.  We  believe  that  the 
imperfect  hedging  of  the  full  dynamics  of  the  two  involved  term  structures  –  the  one  of 
risk‐free  rates  and  the one of  credit  spreads  –  is  the main  reason why even  the hedging 
strategy we analyze here cannot fully realize the potential variance reduction of 75.5%. 
The  improvement  in  variance  reduction  relatively  to  the  hedging  strategy  based 
only  on  the T‐bond  futures  is  statistically  significant  at  the 2.5%  level.  Also,  the  hedging 
errors display a first‐order autocorrelation which is lower than the autocorrelation of the 
unhedged  bond  portfolio  returns.  Accordingly,  we  have  a  consistent  evidence  on  the 
usefulness of this strategy for hedging corporate bond market risk. 
As a  consequence, we conclude  that  the  tested hedging methodology  is  capable of 









We  test  alternative  strategies  for  hedging  a  portfolio  composed  from  eight  BBB‐
rated  corporate  bonds  of  different  maturity.  We  focus  on  market  risk,  rather  than  on 





contrary,  an  implementation  considering  the  modeling  errors  can  lead  to  satisfactory 









and  to  the  consideration  of  modeling  errors.  The  hedging  errors  tend  to  be  negatively 
autocorrelated,  thus  reducing  the  cumulative  error  over  multiple  periods,  and  to  be 
independent from the dynamics of the average credit spread paid on BBB‐rated bonds. This 
suggests  that  the hedging errors are mainly due  to  the  idiosyncratic  returns provided by 




A  simple  strategy  relying  solely  on  T‐bond  futures would  have  been  insufficient  for  this 
purpose, so that it is not clear that such a strategy would have provided a significant added 
value  to  the  bond  portfolio.  On  the  contrary,  we  found  out  that  the  tested  hedging 
methodology  considering  modeling  errors  and  including  fully‐collateralized  synthetic 
credit  derivatives  could  have  reduced  the  variance  by  64.3%  even  during  these  very 
turbulent times. Also for this sub‐sample, the vast majority of the residual hedging errors is 
due  to  the  idiosyncratic  returns  provided  by  the  bond  portfolio,  so  that  increasing  the 
number of bonds in this portfolio might lead to higher degrees of variance reduction. 
Unfortunately,  the  financial  instrument which  is more  commonly  used  in  practice 
for this sort of hedging – the CDX contract – would have led only to marginal improvements 




the  CDX  spread  to  undershoot  the  dynamics  of  bond  spreads.  Even  the  S&P 500  futures 
contract would  have  not  helped much  during  this  period,  since  its  relationship with  the 
credit spreads is too loose to lead to a significant weighting within our hedging strategies. 
Also with respect  to  the dispute on the dynamics of credit spreads summarized  in 
the introduction we find a strong evidence of a change in regime starting from the end of 
2007. This and – possibly  ‐ other past changes  in regime might contribute  to explain  the 




role of  idiosyncratic  risk was  limited. On  the contrary,  in 2008 and 2009  the volatility of 
credit spreads relatively to risk‐free rates was high, the correlation among different points 
along the term structure of credit spreads was very high (suggesting the existence of only 
one  important  systematic  risk  factor),  and  the  role  of  idiosyncratic  risk  was  significant 
(even  though  it  would  have  been  sufficient  to  combine  eight  bonds  issued  by  different 
companies to largely diversify this risk away).    
The  interpretation we give  to our  results  is  that during  times of  financial  stability 
and  ordinary  levels  of  credit  risk,  hedging  investment‐grade  corporate  bond  portfolios 
though  T‐bond  futures  or  other  instruments  linked  to  risk‐free  rates  can  lead  to  very 
effective  immunization. However, during  times of generalized  financial distress  this  is no 
125
  124
longer  the  case  and  the  use  of  financial  instruments  directly  linked  to  credit  spreads 
becomes essential for an accurate hedging. Derivative contracts can be very helpful for this 
purpose as long as they do not involve significant levels of counterparty risk which can lead 
to  substantial  divergences  between  their  market  value  and  their  underlying  value.  This 
interpretation raises the question of how we could  identify  times of generalized  financial 
distress. Barone‐Adesi et al. (2011) show that the lease rate, that is the difference between 





empirical  evidence  should  analyze  how  far  our  conclusions  are  applicable  also  to  other 
fixed‐income  markets  and  to  high‐yield  bonds.  On  the  other  hand,  our  results  clearly 
suggest  that a  full  collateralization of contracts  like CDS would substantially  improve  the 
hedging effectiveness of these contracts. We believe these findings to be reconcilable with 
economic  intuition:  since  the  counterparty  risk  involved  in  current  CDS  contracts  is 






cases,  since we want  to  be  able  to  access  the  extinguishers,  when we  really  need  them. 
Similarly, we should design CDS and other credit derivatives in such a way that they fully 
represent  their  underlying  value,  when  we  really  need  them  to  do  so.  Accordingly,  we 
would  recommend  to  perform  empirical  analysis  verifying  that  actual  market  prices  of 
fully‐collateralized  credit  derivatives  track  the  dynamics  of  credit  spreads  better  than 
traditional CDS contracts, as we would expect. A viable alternative to a full collateralization 
would  be  represented  by  the  development  of  exchange‐traded  CDS  contracts,  the 
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